The Train Is Running. But Who’s at the Helm?
For years, the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) was a vision, tracks being laid, stations sprouting across regions, engines imported from abroad. Now it’s real. Tanzania’s first modern freight and passenger trains have begun rolling between Dar es Salaam and Dodoma, and the line to Mwanza nears completion. The excitement is palpable. But with infrastructure in place, a quieter, more consequential debate begins: who should operate the system?
Should the government, through the Tanzania Railways Corporation (TRC), continue to manage the entire SGR? Or is there a case for inviting private operators, through concessions, joint ventures, or performance-based contracts, to drive efficiency and innovation?
This question isn’t theoretical. It determines whether the SGR becomes a legacy of lasting impact or a high-speed symbol plagued by familiar challenges. With the region watching and trade corridors shifting, Tanzania must decide not just how its trains move, but who moves them.
The Legacy Burden – Lessons from State-Run Rail
Tanzania’s rail story is long and not without lessons. TRC’s predecessor, the Tanzania Railways Limited (TRL), was once central to domestic logistics. But inefficiency, underfunding, and political interference gradually eroded service quality. Passenger trains became unreliable. Freight customers drifted to road transport. Even the Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority (TAZARA), once a marvel of international cooperation, now struggles to sustain consistent operations, operating at just a fraction of its capacity.
Critics of state-run models argue that railways became bureaucracies rather than businesses. Decisions were slow, innovation was stifled, and revenue often took a backseat to politics. When TRL was partially privatized in the 2000s under RITES (an Indian consortium), however, performance didn’t improve as hoped. The contract was eventually canceled.
Yet, state models haven’t always failed. Public ownership has ensured continued access to remote regions, kept fares affordable, and supported long-term infrastructure investment where private investors saw too much risk. The challenge isn’t simply public vs. private, it’s whether the governance model supports accountability, efficiency, and alignment with national priorities.
Today, TRC is again in the spotlight, tasked with operating the most advanced transport asset the country has ever owned. Will it rise to the occasion, or will history repeat itself?
The Efficiency Argument: Can Private Operators Improve Delivery?
Proponents of private-sector involvement are making their case quietly, but with growing urgency. Their argument is grounded in performance.
Private operators, they say, bring specialized expertise, customer service discipline, and the pressure to innovate. Where public enterprises might delay digital ticketing or real-time tracking, private firms compete to offer it. With incentives linked to results, not seniority or political loyalty, efficiency improves.
Globally, many modern rail systems now operate under public-private partnership (PPP) models. In Ethiopia and Kenya, concessions and private participation have shaped freight rail development. In Asia and Europe, some of the most efficient passenger services are privately managed but state-regulated.
President Samia Suluhu Hassan herself has signaled strong support for private-sector involvement across transport logistics. Speaking in July 2025, she stated: “The private sector is no longer a passenger; it must be part of the engine driving our logistics transformation.” This includes aviation, ports, dry ports, and, implicitly, rail.
Tanzania has the legislative foundation to pursue PPPs in rail. The PPP Policy (2017) and updated legal framework allow infrastructure projects to be operated under service, management, lease, or build-operate-transfer models. Already, projects like the Kwala Dry Port near Dodoma have been developed under hybrid arrangements.
But critics of privatization urge caution. Private rail operators, particularly in Africa, often struggle to balance profit and public service. Some concessions overpromise and underdeliver. Others cut corners, raise prices, or fail to serve low-traffic but socially critical routes.
The question, then, isn’t whether private operators can improve delivery. It’s whether Tanzania can design innovative, accountable governance, where risk is shared, quality is enforced, and national interest is preserved.
Risk of Capture: Why Full Privatization Isn’t the Silver Bullet
While the case for private involvement is strong, there’s a counterweight: the risk of elite capture, monopoly pricing, and mission drift. Railways are not just businesses — they are public arteries. If mismanaged under private hands, the result can be as damaging as poor state control.
Some analysts warn that privatization in Africa too often becomes a transfer of monopoly from the state to a politically connected firm. The risks are clear: overpricing, cutting off unprofitable routes, and deferring maintenance to protect profit margins. In the worst cases, governments are forced to retake control at high cost, as Tanzania did with RITES.
SGR also serves broader national and regional objectives. It is not merely a domestic utility; it functions as a geostrategic corridor, the planned connection to Burundi and potentially Rwanda positions Tanzania as a key player in regional logistics. If private entities gain disproportionate control over cross-border infrastructure, it could impact diplomatic leverage and national security.
Moreover, infrastructure built with public debt, over $10 billion for the SGR — carries expectations of national benefit. Citizens may rightfully question why public loans fund assets that are later handed to private operators for gain. For privatization to be politically and socially viable, the process must be transparent, competitive, and clearly in the public interest.
In short, complete privatization may not just be risky, it may be politically impossible without reforming how such decisions are made and explained.
Hybrid Models: Can Shared Governance Deliver the Best of Both Worlds?
Between the extremes of complete state control and total privatization lies a spectrum of hybrid models. These include:
· Management contracts: The state owns the asset; private firms run operations under performance benchmarks.
· Operating concessions: The state sets tariffs and service requirements; the operator earns fees based on volume or service delivery.
· Joint ventures: TRC partners with private firms to jointly run services, splitting risks and profits.
Tanzania already has precedents. In the port sector, the government has embraced private terminal operators, notably with DP World’s involvement at Dar es Salaam Port and planned expansion at Mtwara. These deals, though contentious, show the state’s openness to structured partnerships that retain ownership but outsource efficiency.
Critically, Tanzania’s PPP policy framework supports this direction. It emphasizes risk sharing, transparency, and performance-linked remuneration. Under the law, all PPPs must undergo value-for-money assessments, feasibility reviews, and Cabinet approval.
In rail, this could translate into contracts where private players operate cargo services under strict guidelines, while TRC retains control over pricing, routes, and safety. Alternatively, the government may seek private partners only for high-traffic corridors (like Dar–Morogoro), while running less profitable segments itself.
This layered model allows the state to protect sovereignty and public access, while using private muscle where it matters most: in driving day-to-day performance.
Political Incentives vs. Commercial Realism: Can the State Let Go of the Steering Wheel?
Yet even if the policy and economic logic support shared governance, politics may resist. Infrastructure projects like the SGR are deeply political, symbols of national pride, electoral messaging, and presidential legacy.
There is a risk that operational decisions remain hostage to political optics. Ministers may hesitate to delegate control, fearing public backlash or loss of influence. Bureaucrats may stall reforms, seeing them as threats to institutional power. Even when private actors are invited in, they may be constrained by red tape, delayed payments, or interference.
Moreover, state enterprises like TRC are often treated not just as service providers, but as job reservoirs. Any restructuring that reduces headcount or alters labor terms risks political blowback. In such environments, even the best-designed hybrid models struggle to function.
The question is not just whether Tanzania can share operational control, but whether the current political system is willing to do so.
This tension between political control and commercial realism has persisted in infrastructure reforms for decades. If unresolved, it could once again result in Tanzania having world-class infrastructure but subpar performance.
Choose the Operator Before the Tracks Cool
Tanzania has completed one of the continent’s most ambitious infrastructure undertakings. The Standard Gauge Railway is no longer a plan, it’s a physical asset, humming with possibility. But the real test isn’t in the concrete and steel. It lies in what comes next: operational governance.
This isn’t just about efficiency metrics or revenue models. It’s about who sets the rules, who bears the risks, who reaps the rewards, and, most importantly, who is accountable when things go wrong.
State-run models offer control, inclusivity, and long-term strategic alignment — but often at the cost of speed, innovation, and financial discipline. Private operators promise dynamism and focus but may prioritize profit over equity. The most promising path, especially in Tanzania’s current context, is a principled hybrid: retain public ownership, but design strong, transparent, and performance-driven private partnerships.
Doing so won’t be easy. It requires more than contracts. It demands political courage, regulatory foresight, and public trust. But the alternative, running a modern railway with outdated governance tools, is far worse. Tanzania has a rare chance to not only build modern infrastructure but to modernize the institutions that run it. The trains have started moving. It’s time to decide who should drive, and who ensures they stay on track.
Read more articles by Dr. Wilson Pesabelele