The recent political shifts in Tanzania, particularly Yericko Nyerere’s defection to CHAUMMA and Luhaga Mpina’s move to ACT-Wazalendo, reflect deepening fractures within the opposition ahead of the October 2025 elections. Here is a synthesis of key developments and their implications:
CHADEMA’s Internal Crisis and Defections.
Yericko Nyerere, a former CHADEMA stalwart, publicly joined CHAUMMA on August 6, 2025, declaring CHADEMA “cannot recover” due to leadership failures. His exit followed earlier criticism of CHADEMA’s direction after Freeman Mbowe lost the chairmanship to Tundu Lissu in January 2025.
James Mbowe (no relation to Freeman) also defected to CHAUMMA, signaling a broader exodus of cadres disillusioned with CHADEMA’s infighting and electoral strategy.
Context:
CHADEMA faces existential threats, including disqualification from the 2025 elections for refusing to sign the electoral code of conduct and treason charges against its leader, Tundu Lissu. The High Court has blocked all of her operations just before the elections.
ACT-Wazalendo’s Strategic Gains.
Luhaga Mpina, a former CCM heavyweight and Kisesa MP, joined ACT-Wazalendo on August 4, 2025, after being excluded from CCM’s parliamentary nominations. His defection triggered internal tensions, as party leader Dorothy Semu faced pressure to yield the presidential ticket to him. Mpina is a former Minister for fisheries under the late president John Pombe Magufuli.
Reception:
Mpina’s entry energized ACT-Wazalendo’s congress on August 6, 2025, where delegates erupted in applause during his introduction. The party positioned him as a “strategic asset” to broaden electoral appeal. There is undertone, rarely shared in public, that CCM sends its disgruntled members to destabilize the opposition before elections.
In 1995, the powerful deputy prime minister and interior minister left CCM and joined NCCR-MAGEUZI. He came a distant second in presidential elections in the same year.
In 2010, Dr. Wilbard Slaa whose path to Chadema was caused by dissatisfaction in 1995 Karatu CCM primaries where top echelons defied local preferences and rewarded a national favourite. Dr. Slaa shifted to Chadema where he won the Karatu parliamentary seat that he kept for 15 years. His running for presidency was still viewed as a CCM’s plant.
Much later, the then CCM publicity secretary, Nape Nnauye, quipped Dr. Slaa despite jumping ships he was still a bona-fide CCM member since he never returned the membership card. However, CCM Constitution deems members who have crossed to the opposition have self- deregistered themselves. Still, the suspicious perceptions linger on over CCM bigwigs decamping to the opposition.
In 2015, Former prime minister Edward Lowassa left CCM in a huff after he wasn’t shortlisted for the presidency. He joined Chadema and was accorded with the presidential vying ticket but lost I’m a close election aiding Chadema to break all records in terms of parliamentary and civic representation.
In 2020, there was another CCM luminary, Bernard Membe, who left CCM after seeking to challenge president Magufuli for a second stint. He was dismissed from CCM, and shifted his allegiance to ACT-Wazalendo where he unsuccessfully sought the presidency.
In all these sideshows, it wasn’t ideological differences but dissatisfaction with being elbowed out in the CCM nomination process. As a result the defectors struggle to overcome CCM machinations albeit only Lowassa is regarded as having really made CCM run to keep the presidency.
Luhaga Mpina isn’t expected to captivate the imagination of the electorate as either Mrema in 1995 or Lowassa in 2020. The real reason Luhaga was a linchpin during the draconian Magufuli years, so his beef with CCM clouds his attractiveness. He could pose serious problems in his constituency but nowhere else.
Broader Recruitment:
ACT-Wazalendo has actively courted high-profile defectors, including Sheikh Ponda Issa Ponda and human rights lawyer Peter Madeleka.
Broader Political Implications.
Opposition Fragmentation: CHADEMA’s decline has splintered opposition unity. While CHADEMA boycotts the election citing unfair reforms, ACT-Wazalendo participates but faces credibility challenges due to perceived CCM alignment.
CCM’s Dominance: The ruling party exploits opposition disarray, securing 99% of seats in the 2024 local elections amid allegations of candidate disqualifications and violence.
Democratic Erosion: Tanzania is now classified as “Not Free” by Freedom House, with abductions of critics (e.g., activist Maria Sarungi Tsehai) and restricted media.
Conclusion.
Tanzania’s opposition landscape is reshaped by defections: “CHADEMA” bleeds support due to leadership crises and state repression, while “ACT-Wazalendo” leverages high-profile recruits to position itself as the primary challenger to CCM. However, with CHADEMA barred from elections and ACT-Wazalendo’s internal conflicts unresolved, CCM’s path to a seventh consecutive term appears unchallenged. The 2025 elections may thus cement Tanzania’s slide into “electoral authoritarianism”.
Are These Realignments And Jostling For Power Lend Any Credence Into The Forthcoming Elections?
The political realignments and power struggles in Tanzania ahead of the October 2025 elections reflect a managed democratic erosion rather than genuine competitive pluralism. Here is a structured analysis of their implications:
Opposition Fragmentation as a Credibility Crisis.
CHADEMA’s Elimination: The disqualification of Tanzania’s main opposition party (CHADEMA) for refusing to sign the electoral code of conduct, without prior implementation of agreed reforms, effectively removed the only viable challenger to CCM. This procedural maneuver institutionalizes one-party dominance.
Defections to Minor Parties: High-profile defections (e.g., Yericko Nyerere to CHAUMMA) fragment opposition strength. CHADEMA cadres publicly cite leadership failures and electoral futility, accelerating the party’s collapse and dispersing dissent into smaller, less threatening factions .
CCM’s Factional Jostling: Controlled Pluralism.
Samia’s Balancing Act: President Samia navigates between Magufuli-era hardliners and moderate reformers within CCM. By rehabilitating figures like Paul Makonda (notorious for repression) and appointing Magufuli loyalists (e.g., Doto Biteko), she consolidates power but deepens ideological incoherence. This fuels internal rent-seeking but poses no threat to CCM’s electoral hegemony.
Geographical/Ethnic Schisms: Factions like Speaker Ndugai’s “anti-loan” bloc exploit Mainland-Zanzibar tensions. However, these divisions lack ideological substance, focusing instead on patronage networks. The absence of policy-based factions hollows out intra-party democracy.
ACT-Wazalendo’s Ambiguous Role.
Opportunistic Recruitment: ACT-Wazalendo’s incorporation of CCM defectors (e.g., Luhaga Mpina) boosts visibility but risks perception as a CCM proxy. Mpina’s enthusiastic reception at ACT’s congress contrasts with the party’s failure to challenge CCM’s 99% local election victory in 2024—exposing limited opposition leverage.
Ideological Vacuum: Like CHADEMA, ACT-Wazalendo endorses neoliberal economics, offering no substantive alternative to CCM. This perpetuates voter disillusionment: 71% of youth doubt elections reflect popular will.
Repression as Electoral Strategy.
Legal Authoritarianism: The use of treason charges against Tundu Lissu, abduction of activists, and media gagging (e.g., suspensions of The Citizen) criminalize dissent. These tactics ensure opposition paralysis while maintaining a veneer of constitutionalism.
Regional Parallels: Tanzania mirrors regional trends (Uganda, Rwanda) where legal mechanisms exclude opponents. The EAC’s inaction normalizes this “competitive authoritarianism“.
Systemic Credibility Deficit.
Economic Discontent vs. Political Apathy: Rising inflation and land conflicts (e.g., Maasai displacements) fuel grassroots unrest. Yet repression and opposition fragmentation channel discontent into apathy, not mobilization. Voter turnout plummeted from 67% (2015) to 51% (2020), signaling eroded legitimacy.
A Predetermined Outcome.
These realignments “do not enhance electoral credibility” but exemplify CCM’s strategy to simulate pluralism while eliminating competition. The 2025 elections will likely deliver a CCM victory amid low turnout, repression, and opposition irrelevance, cementing Tanzania’s descent into “electoral authoritarianism“. Without international pressure for inclusive reforms, the cycle of managed democracy will persist.
Read more analysis by Rutashubanyuma Nestory
