Picture two trains leaving the coast at dusk. The first is sleek and mostly empty, a prestige service with a handful of passengers and an expensive timetable. The second is a 100-wagon freight monster, loaded nose-to-tail with ore and coal, throttling steadily through the night. One of these trains is a photograph; the other is an economy.
Railways live or die on freight. It has always been so. Passenger glamour can get a ribbon cut, but bulk cargo pays the bills, especially in countries where per-capita incomes and trip densities cannot support high fares. This is the hard arithmetic behind every corridor Tanzania has ever dreamed of building. If we want trains that run for decades rather than headlines that last for days, we need to feed them rocks.
Liganga’s iron ore and Mchuchuma’s coal are exactly that: the predictable, heavy, year-round freight that turns the Southern Corridor from a line on a map into a living artery. They are not merely mines; they are the anchor cargo that can justify a rail spine from Mtwara into the interior and a port that finally earns its geography. And once those trains run for ore and coal, other cargoes, cashews and maize, cement and fuel, containers for Malawi and eastern DRC, can piggyback on the back of the heavy baseline.
The question, then, is not whether Tanzania should build rail. The question is whether we will design railways for the economics that actually sustain them. That begins with bulk.
The bulk economics of rail
Rail becomes cost-effective at the point where tonnage overwhelms road logic. Ore and coal cross that threshold before the conversation even begins. A single long train can replace roughly 200 lorries on a given stretch; it does so with fewer accidents, lower fuel per tonne-kilometre, less wear on highways, and far fewer “informal costs” at axle-load posts and roadside stops. Every wagon that rolls on steel is a kilometre of asphalt saved for buses, vans and farm pickups.
But bulk is not just about weight. It is about reliability. Ore and coal are not seasonal like harvests or holiday rushes. They move rain or shine, month in, month out. That steadiness is what lenders and operators prize. With predictable cargo, a railway can plan crews, maintenance windows and locomotive rotations. A port can justify a bulk berth. A bank can price risk without shrugging. This is the difference between a rail business and a rail hobby.
There is also a systems dividend. Once heavy trains set the cadence, other freight can fall in behind. Agricultural producers along the line gain a route that is already paid for by ore and coal. Container operators find slots in timetables that would not exist without anchor cargo. Even passenger services become less fragile because the operating company has a base of revenue that is not hostage to fuel price spikes or a single procurement cycle.
Trucks do not disappear in this world; they thrive where they should, on last-mile and medium hops, under 300–400 kilometres, between farms, ICDs and local markets. The point of rail is not to kill trucking; it is to keep trucking from killing the roads.
None of this is romantic. It is engineering and cash flow. If the Southern Corridor is to be more than an artist’s impression, it needs the weight and tempo that only ore and coal provide. And that brings us to geography.
Southern Corridor as a national strategy
The Southern Corridor is not one project; it is a choreography: rail link + port + mines + hinterland. Get the steps right and the south of Tanzania stops being a periphery and starts being a platform. Get them wrong and we will have built an expensive detour to nowhere.
The rail link. The backbone is a Mtwara–interior line connecting the coast to Mchuchuma and Liganga. This is not a spur in search of cargo; it is cargo in search of a spine. The line must be specified and phased around actual tonnage commitments, take-or-pay contracts with the mines that guarantee trains per day, not “expected volumes” at ribbon-cuttings. Align passing loops, gradients and axle loads with the real physics of ore and coal, not the wish list of speeches. Design yards and ICDs where freight actually originates, Ludewa, Njombe, Songea, not where a map looks clean.
Port expansion. Rails that end at a congested quay are yards, not corridors. Mtwara port must be upgraded to handle bulk carriers with the draught and loading rates ore and coal demand. Conveyors, stockyards, stacker-reclaimers, dust controls, these are not luxuries; they are the interface between inland ambition and maritime reality. A corridor without a bulk-ready port is a pipeline with the tap closed.
Integration beyond the mines. Anchors hold ships steady so others can tie up. Once the ore-coal rhythm is established, the corridor can carry far more: cashews and sesame from Mtwara and Lindi; maize, beans and timber from the highlands; cement and fuel to inland towns; imported inputs for light industry. But this only happens if we design for it from the start. ICDs along the line must be able to handle agricultural bulks and containers, not just hoppers. Tariffs must be set so that smaller shippers can ride the rails without being priced off. Siding locations should reflect market catchments rather than bureaucratic convenience.
Regional outreach. Geography is generous here. Mtwara sits closer than Dar es Salaam to much of northern Mozambique and southern Malawi; with the right border procedures and road feeders, the corridor can draw cargo from those markets, and, longer term, even from eastern Zambia and southern DRC. That is how corridors become ecosystems: by serving neighbours whose trade enriches our throughput.
The south as an industrial belt. If rail and port work, the space between Mtwara and Njombe can host more than pits. Industrial estates can sprout near sub-stations, serving not only the mines but fabrication, agro-processing, warehousing and repair yards. Towns stop being transient camps and start being communities with clinics, schools and SMEs that have reason to exist after any single project winds down.
This is strategy, not sentiment. The corridor is a national instrument, a way to make the map work for us. But instruments demand discipline. Mines, rail and port must move as a single system, not as cousins who exchange holiday cards. Financing must be sized and sequenced to freight that is real, not to metaphors that are convenient. And governance, of tariffs, of access, of interfaces, must favour a multi-user corridor, open to all credible shippers, rather than a closed loop captured by one concession that stifles everyone else.
The alternative is familiar: a spur built for a promise that never quite arrives, a port that can’t load at speed, a tariff that chases freight back onto the road, a timetable no farmer can trust. We have lived that film. The Southern Corridor is our chance to write a better one, in which the heavy stuff pays for the rails and the whole economy rides the train.
Lessons from past projects
Tanzania has dreamed in steel and rail before. The Southern Corridor must be approached with humility, because history is littered with grand lines that looked unstoppable on paper but stumbled when freight never came.
TAZARA’s warning. Built with Chinese aid in the 1970s, the Tanzania–Zambia Railway was one of Africa’s boldest undertakings. It gave Zambia an outlet to the sea that bypassed apartheid South Africa and Rhodesia. Politically, it was a triumph. Economically, it struggled. Why? Because copper production fluctuated, alternative routes improved, and non-mining freight never filled the gap. Without steady anchor tonnage, maintenance costs ballooned, locomotives sat idle, and subsidy became a way of life. The lesson: rail must secure guaranteed freight before rails are laid.
SGR’s caution. Today’s Standard Gauge Railway between Dar es Salaam and Morogoro has been a prestige showcase. But debates swirl about its financial sustainability. Passenger ridership cannot pay for a multi-billion-dollar line; only bulk freight can. Advocates quietly admit that SGR’s long-term logic hinges on serving heavy users like Kabanga Nickel, the central corridor mines, and large agricultural exporters. Without them, the SGR risks becoming an expensive commuter service subsidised by taxpayers.
Comparisons abroad. In South Africa, the Sishen–Saldanha iron ore line thrives because it moves nothing but ore at world-class volumes and efficiency. In Mozambique, the Sena line only turned viable once coal exports from Moatize scaled up. Elsewhere in Africa, “prestige” passenger-first railways have either collapsed or required endless subsidy.
The lesson is as sharp as steel: build rail around freight, not fantasy. If Liganga and Mchuchuma are locked in as anchor shippers, the Southern Corridor has a chance. If they are not, the line risks becoming another white elephant.
Risks and pitfalls
No corridor is inevitable. For every success story, there are corridors that stalled or fell short.
Execution delays. The mines, the rail line, and the port must be synchronised. If the mines lag, rail runs empty. If the rail lags, ore sits in the ground. If the port lags, cargo bottlenecks on the quay. Synchronisation is the hardest part of corridor planning, and the one most often ignored.
Financing gaps. These are multi-billion-dollar projects. Private financiers demand firm contracts; governments often rely on concessional finance or Chinese loans. If financing collapses or terms become punitive, the corridor stalls. Tanzania must present a credible investment case, not just a patriotic appeal.
Over-concentration. If Liganga and Mchuchuma are the only anchor cargo, the corridor is brittle. If either project falters, the line loses justification. The corridor must diversify: agricultural bulks, fuels, manufactured goods, even regional transit cargo. Anchor freight should be necessary, but not alone sufficient.
Governance risks. Corridors are vulnerable to poor tariff design, corruption in concessions, and bureaucratic turf wars. If tariffs are set too high to recover costs quickly, shippers return to trucks. If access is monopolised by one concession, smaller shippers are locked out. If customs delays persist, the corridor is uncompetitive against roads. Governance is as critical as engineering.
Environmental and social friction. Communities displaced by rail or port expansion need fair compensation. Environmental impacts of coal transport must be mitigated. Without social licence, projects invite protests and sabotage.
Governance and policy choices
If the Southern Corridor is to succeed, certain choices must be made upfront.
Anchor agreements. Secure long-term take-or-pay contracts with Liganga and Mchuchuma. Mines must commit to shipping volumes by rail for 20+ years, guaranteeing freight that underwrites investment.
Tariff design. Price freight to encourage volume, not to maximise short-term revenue. Railways earn sustainability by keeping trains full, not by charging too much per tonne and driving shippers away.
Phasing. Build rail in realistic phases tied to freight readiness. Prioritise the segment to the mines, then expand outward as traffic grows. Avoid the trap of building prestige segments first without freight.
Multi-user model. Ensure the corridor is open access. Infrastructure must be regulated so that multiple shippers can use it fairly. Avoid closed concessions that lock the corridor into narrow uses.
Transparency. Publish freight forecasts, financing terms, and construction milestones. Citizens and investors must see what is promised and what is delivered. Rumour is corrosive; facts are stabilising.
Cross-border facilitation. Work with Malawi, Zambia, and Mozambique to create predictable transit protocols. The corridor will only thrive if it competes regionally.
Counterarguments and answers
“We can just truck the ore.”
Not at scale. Roads will crumble under tens of millions of tonnes. Maintenance costs, accidents, and delays will dwarf any trucking “savings.” Rail is the only rational mode.
“Passenger demand is enough.”
It never is. No country at Tanzania’s income level sustains long railways on passengers alone. Freight is king. Passengers are garnish.
“These projects have stalled for decades; why expect success now?”
Delay is not destiny. If financing, governance, and synchronisation align, Liganga and Mchuchuma can still justify the corridor. The opportunity cost of inaction, forex drained on steel imports, roads destroyed by trucks, is too high to surrender.
“Coal dependence undermines the corridor’s green image.”
Today’s anchor does not have to define tomorrow’s. Corridors evolve. The same rail that hauls coal can tomorrow haul cement, grain, containers, and manufactured exports. Infrastructure endures; cargo mixes change.
Rails for rocks, arteries for nations
Return to the two trains: the empty prestige passenger run and the loaded ore convoy. The difference is not engineering but economics. Tanzania has built the first before, and paid dearly for the glamour. It has not yet secured the second at scale.
The Southern Corridor is a chance to change that story. If Liganga and Mchuchuma are locked in as anchor freight, if rail, mines, and port are synchronised, if tariffs and governance are disciplined, the corridor can become a true artery, serving agriculture, industry, and regional trade.
If not, it will be another expensive detour, a train built to move air.
Railways live on freight. In Tanzania’s south, that means rocks: iron and coal, heavy enough to justify steel rails, steady enough to carry an economy. If we can align vision with execution, these rocks will not only forge steel but also lay down the tracks for national transformation.
