A renowned don of law, professor Palamagamba Kabudi ought to be the last man on earth to defend the injustices inflicted in the seemingly refurbished election laws. The only thing he succeeded was to remind us that once in politics one eschews whatever he ever learnt to fit in a political template for sheer survival.
The establishment will love professor Kabudi even more after he had offered a ringing endorsement of election laws that have disenfranchised the electorate in much more insidious ways than all election laws crafted since independence. The new election laws were designed to enshrine massive rigging than all the previous laws, and I will explain why. In fact, the new laws will ensure the ballot isn’t counted, tallied and a winner declared with the electorate pimped to challenge the outcome!
In order to understand why professor Kabudi is more of a problem than a solution we need to capture what he had exactly said before I trash his invidious views. My conclusion is since he is a chief beneficiary of the disenfranchisement of the electorate he has every reason to support electoral injustices in order to enjoy the undeserved benefits. This is my take.
What Did He Say?
“….ndugu washiriki tunafanya uchaguzi mkuu mwaka huu katika mazingira bora tangu tupate uhuru. Mazingira bora ya kisheria. Mwaka jana bunge lilitunga sheria mbili za uchaguzi. Moja ni sheria ya Tume Huru Ya Taifa Ya Uchaguzi namba 2 ya mwaka 2024.
Na sheria hii imekuja na mabadilko makubwa sana. Ukitaka kuelewa Tanzania imepiga hatua mpaka mwaka 1992, Mwenyekiti wa Tume ya Uchaguzi alikuwa ni Spika wa bunge la jamhuri ya Tanzania. Kuanzia mwaka kenda na tisini na mbili, Mwenyekiti wa Tume ya Uchaguzi alikuwa Spika wa Bunge la Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania. Leo tumekwenda ni Jaji wa Mahakama ya Rufaa.
Na wajumbe wote walikuwa wanateuliwa na Rais moja kwa moja sasa wataeuliwa ma Rais baada ya kuwa wamependekezwa. Lakini ukiisoma hiyo sheria imewapa wajumbe ulinzi wa kisheria wajumbe wa Tume huru ya uchaguzi.
Hawataondolewa bila mchakato maalumu, hawezi kuja mtu akaamka asubuhi na kusema sikutaki na kuwaondoa, lazima kuwepo na mchakato wa kiuchunguzi wa kuthibitisha hato kabla ya kuwaondoa.
Lakini, sheria muhimu sana ya uchaguzi ambayo mimi ninaamini kwamba Tume ya Uchaguzi itapata nafasi ya kuwaelezea kwenuni sheria ya uchaguzi wa Rais, Wabunge na Madiwani…” End of quotation.
A culling Of What Don Kabudi Said.
Here is a summary of its contents:
The text describes significant electoral reforms in Tanzania enacted through a new law in 2024, the Independent National Electoral Commission Act (No. 2 of 2024).
The key changes highlighted are:
Leadership Change: The chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) is now a Justice of the Court of Appeal. This is a major change from the previous system where the Speaker of the National Assembly held this position (from 1992 onwards).
Appointment Process: While the President still appoints members, the process is now based on recommendations, implying a more consultative approach compared to the past where the President appointed them directly.
Legal Protections for Members: The new law provides commissioners with strong legal protections amounting to security of tenure. They cannot be removed arbitrarily (“cannot be removed without a special investigative process”). A formal procedure must be followed to investigate and verify any allegations before removal can occur.
Professor Kabudi, characterizes these changes as “major reforms” that represent significant progress for Tanzania, creating a better legal environment for the upcoming general election. His belief is that this new, more independent and protected commission will be able to better explain electoral laws to the public.
The Regime Espouses A Deceit & The Conventional Wisdom!
The regime as evidenced by don Kabudi’s advocacy is to mislead the general public that Tanzania has embraced meaningful reforms, and this is their side of story which stands no chance of delivering free, fair and verifiable elections. What the regime is attempting to sell as a roadmap to democracy and the rule of law in Tanzania is summarized below. Thereafter, I will present a riposte of my own.
Regime’s Analysis of Tanzania’s 2024 Electoral Reforms: Achievements and Remaining Challenges.
Introduction: Tanzania’s Electoral Reform Context.
The “2024 electoral reforms” in Tanzania represent a significant milestone in the country’s ongoing political evolution, marking the most substantial changes to its electoral governance framework since the reintroduction of multiparty democracy in 1992. These reforms come against a backdrop of longstanding criticism regarding “electoral integrity” and “presidential influence” over electoral processes.
The amendments to the electoral laws, particularly the Independent National Electoral Commission Act (No. 2 of 2024), address fundamental concerns about the independence and impartiality of electoral institutions that have persisted through multiple administrations.
President Samia Suluhu Hassan’s administration has positioned these reforms as part of her broader agenda to “strengthen democracy” and improve Tanzania’s international standing following the controversial 2020 elections and the authoritarian tendencies of her predecessor, John Magufuli.
The reforms emerge from a complex political context where the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party has maintained dominance for decades, while opposition parties and civil society organizations have consistently pushed for “genuine electoral reform” to level the political playing field.
Historical Context of Electoral Governance in Tanzania.
Evolution of Electoral Administration.
Pre-1992 Era:
Tanzania operated under a “single-party system” with the CCM (formerly TANU) as the only legally permitted political organization. The electoral system during this period was designed to maintain CCM dominance rather than facilitate genuine political competition.
Transition to Multipartysm (1992):
Following the recommendations of the Nyalali Commission, Tanzania transitioned to a multiparty system. However, the “constitutional and legal framework” retained significant elements that preserved the ruling party’s advantage, including presidential control over electoral appointments.
Presidential Dominance:
From 1992 until the 2024 reforms, the President of Tanzania held “sweeping powers” over the electoral commission, including the exclusive authority to appoint and dismiss commissioners without meaningful checks and balances. This arrangement consistently drew criticism from opposition parties and democracy advocates who argued that it compromised the commission’s independence.
Problematic Electoral History.
Tanzania’s electoral history has been marred by “controversies and irregularities”, particularly in the periods leading up to these reforms:
2015 Elections: The election of John Magufuli was accompanied by “increased authoritarian practices”, including restrictions on political rallies and media freedom.
2020 Elections: The general elections were “violence-marred” and widely criticized for irregularities, with the government engaging in severe “oppression of political dissent”. Opposition parties faced unprecedented restrictions, and their candidates were often prevented from campaigning freely.
Zanzibar’s Electoral Issues: The semi-autonomous archipelago has experienced particularly “contentious elections”, with the 2020 vote characterized by widespread allegations of manipulation and violence.
Key Provisions of the 2024 Electoral Laws.
Composition and Leadership of the Electoral Commission.
The most significant change introduced by the 2024 reforms concerns the **composition and appointment process** for the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC):
Leadership Qualifications: The new law mandates that the chairperson of the electoral commission must be a **serving or retired appellate judge** (from the Court of Appeal), replacing the previous system where the Speaker of the National Assembly typically held this position . This change is designed to enhance the “perceived independence” and judicial character of the commission’s leadership.
Commission Membership: While the president retains appointment authority, the new law establishes “stricter qualification criteria” for commissioners and introduces a more “consultative selection process”. Commissioners are now required to possess demonstrated expertise in relevant fields such as law, governance, or public administration.
Appointment Process Reforms.
The 2024 reforms have introduced a “more transparent and inclusive process” for appointing electoral commissioners:
Stakeholder Consultation: While the president still formally appoints commissioners, the new law requires “consultation with various stakeholders” before nominations are made, though the exact nature of this consultation remains somewhat ambiguous.
Parliamentary Approval: The reforms introduce a requirement for “parliamentary ratification” of presidential appointments to the commission, potentially allowing for greater scrutiny of candidates’ qualifications and impartiality.
Legal Protections for Electoral Commissioners.
Security of Tenure Provisions.
A crucial aspect of the 2024 reforms is the enhanced **job security for electoral commissioners**, designed to insulate them from political interference:
Dismissal Procedures: Commissioners can no longer be removed at the president’s discretion. The new law establishes a “formal investigative process” that must be followed before any dismissal can occur. This process includes requiring evidence of misconduct or incapacity and providing the commissioner with an opportunity to respond to allegations.
Fixed Terms: Commissioners are now appointed for “fixed terms” that do not coincide with electoral cycles, reducing the likelihood of appointments being made for short-term political advantage.
Operational Independence Enhancements.
The reforms include several provisions aimed at strengthening the commission’s “operational autonomy”:
Budgetary Guarantees: The commission now has “enhanced budgetary protections” to prevent the executive from using financial pressure to influence electoral decisions.
Decision-Making Autonomy: The law explicitly affirms the commission’s authority to make “operational decisions” without seeking approval from the executive branch, particularly regarding the day-to-day administration of elections.
Implications of the Reforms.
Political Implications.
The 2024 electoral reforms have significant “political ramifications: for Tanzania’s democratic trajectory:
Leveling the Playing Field: By enhancing the independence of the electoral commission, the reforms potentially “reduce institutional bias” in favor of the ruling CCM party, which has governed Tanzania since independence. This could lead to more competitive elections in the future.
Opposition Response: Opposition parties, which have historically boycotted electoral reform processes they viewed as flawed, have responded “cautiously optimistically” to these changes. However, they continue to emphasize that additional reforms are needed, particularly regarding the inclusion of independent candidates.
CCM Internal Dynamics: The reforms have exposed “divisions within the ruling party” between reformists aligned with President Hassan and hardliners who preferred the previous system that offered the party greater institutional advantages.
Legal and Constitutional Implications.
The reforms represent an important “evolution in Tanzania’s constitutional framework”:
Checks and Balances: By reducing presidential control over electoral administration, the reforms strengthen institutional checks and balances, a critical component of democratic governance that had been weakened under previous administrations.
Constitutional Alignment: The changes help align Tanzania’s electoral practices with “constitutional principles” that had been routinely violated under previous electoral management systems, particularly regarding equal treatment of political participants.
Regional Implications.
Tanzania’s electoral reforms have “broader significance for the East African region”:
Regional Standard-Setting: As one of East Africa’s larger and more influential countries, Tanzania’s adoption of more independent electoral governance mechanisms may “create regional pressure” for similar reforms in neighboring countries.
Democratic Example: The reforms potentially position Tanzania as a “positive example of democratic transition” in a region that has experienced democratic backsliding in recent years, including in Uganda and Rwanda.
Challenges and Limitations.
Implementation Challenges.
Despite their progressive nature, the 2024 reforms face significant “implementation hurdles”:
Political Will: The effectiveness of the reforms will ultimately depend on the “genuine commitment” of the political leadership to implement them in spirit rather than merely technically complying with the letter of the law.
Institutional Culture: Changing the “deeply entrenched practices” of electoral administration will require extensive retraining of electoral officials and overcoming institutional resistance to change.
Resource Constraints: The enhanced responsibilities of the electoral commission will require “adequate funding” and technical capacity, which may be challenging in Tanzania’s resource-constrained environment.
Remaining Gaps in the Electoral Framework.
Several “significant gaps remain” in Tanzania’s electoral framework despite the 2024 reforms:
Independent Candidacy: The reforms did not address the prohibition on **independent candidates**, which continues to restrict political participation to those affiliated with officially registered parties . This limitation has been challenged repeatedly in court, including through cases brought by activist Christopher Mtikila.
Zanzibar’s Electoral System: The “unique political status” of Zanzibar and its continuing electoral tensions present unresolved challenges that the reforms did not specifically address.
Restrictive Laws: Numerous “restrictive laws” from the Magufuli era remain in place, including the Cybercrimes Act, Media Services Act, and others that constrain political campaigning and freedom of expression.
Conclusion and Recommendations.
Assessment of the Reforms.
Tanzania’s 2024 electoral reforms represent a “significant step forward” in the country’s democratic development, addressing long-standing criticisms about presidential dominance over electoral institutions. The enhanced protections for electoral commissioners’ security of tenure and the requirement for judicial leadership of the commission constitute meaningful progress toward “electoral integrity” and “institutional independence”.
However, these reforms should be viewed as part of an “ongoing process” rather than a comprehensive solution to Tanzania’s electoral challenges. The persistence of other restrictive laws and the exclusion of independent candidates continue to limit the potential for fully free and fair political competition.
Recommendations for Further Reform.
To build on the progress achieved through the 2024 reforms, Tanzania should consider “additional measures”:
Constitutional Review: Undertake a comprehensive “constitutional review process” to address fundamental governance issues, including the structure of the union between Tanzania and Zanzibar and the expansion of political rights.
Legal Reform: Repeal or substantially amend “restrictive law” from the Magufuli era that constrain freedom of expression, association, and assembly.
Independent Candidates: Amend the electoral laws to allow for “independent candidates” in all elections, implementing the decisions of both domestic courts and regional human rights bodies.
Civic Education: Implement comprehensive “voter education programs” to inform citizens about the reformed electoral processes and their rights and responsibilities under the new system.
The successful implementation of the 2024 reforms will depend on continued “political commitment”, “adequate resource allocation”, and “active engagement” from civil society and international partners. If effectively implemented, these changes have the potential to restore trust in Tanzania’s electoral system and contribute to the consolidation of democratic governance in the country.
My Take:
The new election laws have not improved our democracy bit has made it worse. In the current legal setup voters can challenge the election results of elected MPs and Councillors but now only candidates, the A.G and political parties can challenge results annulling the constitutional imperative that bestowed the destiny of the nation on the electorate.
Second, the new law, like the old law, continues to corrupt the arms of the government: the judiciary, the executive and the Parliament. Having judges having anything to do with the management of elections violates the doctrine of separation of powers engendered in the constitution.
The judiciary cannot be a final arbiter in election disputes when members of the judiciary masquerade as election managers. The election laws compromise the independence of the judiciary well enshrined in the constitution. Unless the election laws outlaw members of the judiciary from managing elections, courts will not be trusted to handle and resolve the election disputes.
Third, the election laws have failed to grasp why we go to elections. Had the elections laws answered this simple question it could have become quite clear that public servants cannot manage our elections for a simple reason; they are actors and agents of a regime whose performance is under scrutiny. Having public servants managing our elections tender the whole exercise a squander of resources since the doctrine of “No one should be a judge of his own cause is upended.
Fourth, election laws have not made it mandatory to apply the latest technologies to transmit and display election results from the polling booths in the INEC public portal. The law says manual transportation of election results will prevail as it was an old law creating fertile ground for replacement of official election forms with fake ones for the purpose and intent of occasioning massive rigging. In all elections since 1992, doctored election forms have replaced official ones to ensure CCM ironclad stay in power is uninterrupted irrespective of the electorate’s profound wishes.
Fifth, the election law is silent for INEC to declare polling booth results as a credible source of ward, constituency and national results. It is preposterous to refuse to acknowledge that since independence no election law has required election bodies to post polling booth results in its website as a condition of declaring results of ward, constituency and national level! As disturbing as it may sound since independence, election bodies notwithstanding their nomenclature cannot prove or justify their electoral declarations since they were not required to collect, preserve and display those results. The aim was too obvious to ignore: afflicting electoral injustices through opacity, nothing less.
Sixth, lack of constituency level secretariat has compromised the independence of the INEC. It has been placed under the architectural constraints of the executive. It has no employees it hired and has disciplinary power over the seconded employees from the government it temporary hires. Without having permanent staff under hire and fire of the INEC, the commissioners are mere marionettes nothing more. The are there to draw huge salaries and pinch procurement deals but declare cooked results prepared for them by the executive.
Seventh, don Kabudi applauded the process of hiring the commissioners that it is inclusive and consultative but fails to appreciate who appoints “Kamati ya Uteuzi” that hires the commissioners. All members of “kamati ya uteuzi” hires the commissioners and holds no disciplinary powers over them. Disciplinary powers against the INEC Commissioners are presidential prerogatives. I have never seen an employer who is devoid of disciplinary powers except at INEC. Everything there still begins and ends with the president who shouldn’t have any role since is a conflicted stakeholder.
Eight, “Kamati ya Uteuzi” that hires INEC commissioners is exclusively overburdened by presidential appointees. Nobody is there unless that person is a presidential appointee. That alone reduces “Kamati ya Uteuzi” into a proxy. I am really at a loss when don Kabudi made a case that now we have the best ever election laws! There is no iota to suggest that. What we now have is hypocrisy attempting to overshadow the gospel truth.
What we need is severance of presidential appointees from masquerading as election managers for a simple reason they are development agents who lack qualification to manage elections. Since our constitution states we are a multiparty democracy only registered political parties should elect members of the “kamati ya Uteuzi” that will have appointment and disciplinary powers over INEC, INEC should have an independent secretariat to cover all constituencies.
Ninth, INEC should stripped of a “quasi judicial body” that are behind the disqualification of opposition candidates and political parties. Election laws have apportioned unchecked powers to INEC making it a judge of its own causes. It doubles down as a complainant, witness and a judge all rolled in one. INEC shouldn’t have powers to disqualify anybody unless it lodge its complaint before a court of law. That way we will terminate the abuse of public office now too passim.
Last, INEC too shouldn’t be allowed to craft “Code of Conduct” with powers to disqualify candidates or political parties. What the new election laws have done is to empower INEC to override the qualifications of political parties and candidates well stipulated in the constitution. The qualification of a registered political party in Tanzania is to sign “code of ethics” with the office of registrar of political parties. Other bodies cannot impose the same values again. Equally, it is wrong for the INEC to impose technicalities to disqualify opposition candidates. I say so there is no record where NEC has disqualified CCM candidates at any level.
Qualifications for candidates and political parties stated in the constitution are final and shouldn’t be trumped by election laws of any kind.
These are minimal reforms before 2025 elections but will not be enacted since the aims is to massively rig the elections. As a parting shot, Tanzania education consumes a lot of resources but remains ineffective to contribute in the development of a nation because of failures to grasp generational wealth must come before personal or family wealth.
Most of Tanzania graduates defend injustice not knowing they are sellout of our collective future. Good leadership is all we are asking irrespective of where it hails, and we ought to trust the voters not the powerbrokers to choose them.
Having said so, Tanzania is still “work in progress” transiting from an archaic one party dictatorship into pluralism. The journey is proving “too bumpy” with many misteps on the way but we will get there despite “anti reformers” resting change with the power of the gun.
