Hold a lump of coal in your hand and you feel two truths at once. It is dense with stored heat, promise of flame, power, and the stubborn energy that forged the twentieth century. Turn it in the light and you see the shadow too: smoke, ash, and the controversy that trails coal into every debate about the twenty-first.
Mchuchuma sits at the heart of that contradiction for Tanzania. For decades it has been imagined as the twin to Liganga’s iron ore: coal to fire furnaces and provide base-load power; iron to feed a domestic steel industry. Together they would justify a southern rail spine and a working Mtwara port, turning an under-served geography into an industrial corridor. On a map, it is elegant. In politics and finance, it is difficult.
The question is not whether coal lit the modern world, it did, and still does in many countries. The question is whether Tanzania can use Mchuchuma as an enabler without becoming a trap: a bridge that helps us build firm power and steel capacity now, while we keep our eyes fixed on a cleaner horizon. To answer that, we have to face both faces of coal honestly.
The industrial necessity case
Fuel for steel. Steelmaking needs a carbon-rich input, traditionally coke, to reduce iron ore into metal. You cannot roll rails, beams, and plate with aspiration alone. In the Liganga concept, Mchuchuma is not a side note; it is the fuel that turns ore into molten iron. Without a reliable carbon source, the domestic steel dream stalls at the mine mouth. Imports keep filling the gap, draining foreign exchange and exporting jobs.
Base-load for the grid. Tanzania’s grid has improved but remains vulnerable to hydrology and outages. Ambitious industry cannot run on “maybe megawatts.” Coal plants, for all their baggage, provide steady base-load, a drumbeat of power that allows smelters, mills, and factories to plan shifts and finance equipment. In the southern system in particular, a firm anchor frees renewables to play a complementary role rather than an impossible one: intermittent generation trying to carry a heavy industrial load alone.
Railway economics that add up. You don’t build a railway to move air; you build it to move bulk. Coal tonnage from Mchuchuma, paired with iron ore from Liganga, is the freight logic behind a Mtwara–interior line. Once the trains are running for ore and coal, they can carry agricultural produce, cement, fuel, and containers. In that sense, coal is not only energy; it is also cargo, the heavy baseline that makes a corridor viable for many users, not just one mine.
Energy sovereignty and price stability. Every tonne of locally sourced fuel displaces a tonne bought in dollars. For a country whose import bill is sensitive to global energy prices, domestic coal offers a hedge: less exposure to price spikes and supply disruptions beyond our control. Sovereignty is not only a flag; it is the ability to keep factories turning when sea lanes are tight and prices are unfriendly.
Regional development and jobs. In Njombe and along the southern corridor, Mchuchuma is jobs in the mine and in everything around it, transport, maintenance, catering, housing, safety. If the corridor is planned for many users, those jobs spread into fabrication yards, agro-processing plants, and logistics hubs that will outlive any one project.
None of this denies coal’s costs. It sets the case that, for where Tanzania stands today, coal can be a means: fuel for steel, foundation for power, cargo for rail, and a shove that helps a new corridor stand. But a means must be measured against its risks.
The risks and costs
Climate politics, real finance. Coal is the most carbon-intensive fossil fuel. That sentence is no longer a talking point, it is a financing constraint. Many global lenders have withdrawn from new coal projects; insurers price them defensively; export credit agencies are under pressure to limit support. Even where money is available, terms can be tougher and maturities shorter, raising the cost of power and steel produced. Carbon adjustment measures in key markets, especially for energy-intensive products like steel, are moving from proposal to policy. A coal-anchored steel plant risks paying a tariff at the border simply for how it made its metal.
Stranded-asset risk. The world is not shutting coal tomorrow, but it is tightening every year. If a plant is designed only around yesterday’s technology, it may still be paying off debt when policy and market signals turn sharply against it. That is the essence of a stranded asset: infrastructure that cannot recover its costs because the world moved on faster than its repayment schedule. For a sovereign, that risk morphs into contingent liabilities and pressure on the public balance sheet.
Local environmental externalities. Climate is global; pollution is personal. Communities near coal mines and plants live with dust, particulate emissions, sulfur and nitrogen oxides, ash disposal, and water risks. Without rigorous controls, and the power to run them reliably, air quality worsens and health costs mount. Water used in processing must be treated consistently; ash needs engineered storage; haul roads must be managed to protect villages. These are not toggle switches but systems that require money, discipline, and steady electricity to operate as promised.
Perception and the national brand. Tanzania earns global goodwill from its conservation story: parks, coastlines, and a tourism brand built on nature. A coal-heavy narrative sits awkwardly beside that identity if handled carelessly. It is not a reason to freeze all industrial use, but it is a reminder that how we talk about Mchuchuma matters. A story of balanced transition, of careful use while building cleaner capacity, can coexist with tourism. A story of uncritical coal triumphalism cannot.
Lock-in, the quiet danger. Infrastructure shapes choices. A big bet on coal plants without flexibility can lock the grid into high-carbon generation for decades, discouraging investment in alternatives and making every later change more expensive. The same is true for process design in steel: fix the plant around only one fuel and you close the door on cleaner inputs later. Lock-in is not dramatic; it is incremental, and therefore easy to ignore until it is expensive to reverse.
Debt and opportunity cost. Every dollar mobilised for a coal unit is a dollar that cannot fund transmission upgrades, gas peakers, utility-scale solar, storage pilots, or industrial efficiency. If coal crowds out these investments, the system grows brittle. Worse, if plant utilisation falls due to policy or market shifts, the debt still has to be serviced, by taxpayers or by higher tariffs for consumers and industry.
Social licence at risk. Communities will tolerate inconvenience when they feel respected and see benefits. They become opponents when they experience pollution, noise, or dangerous roads without compensation, jobs, or a credible grievance channel. A single well-managed resettlement and safety programme will never be news; a single gross failure will be. Social licence, once lost, is expensive to buy back.
Export market headwinds. If Tanzania’s steel hopes include regional exports, note that procurement rules and private buyers are already embedding ESG criteria. A plant that can demonstrate a path to lower carbon intensity, via grid mix, process efficiency, or future hydrogen blending, will find markets more open than one that cannot. This is not virtue signaling; it is contract language.
Put together, these costs do not add up to an automatic “no.” They add up to an adult conversation about how coal fits, how long it fits, and what must be built around it so that it helps rather than hurts. In other words, Mchuchuma needs policy, not slogans: a plan that is honest about our stage of development, committed to firm power for industry, disciplined about pollution and community impacts, and flexible enough to evolve as technology and markets change.
The balancing act, a just transition lens
The dilemma of Mchuchuma is not binary. It is not a simple “yes to coal” or “no to coal.” It is about sequencing and balance. Tanzania’s industrialisation cannot leapfrog overnight to 100 percent renewables. It requires firm power, heavy fuel for smelting, and logistics cargo to make rail economics work. Coal can provide that foundation, but only if it is positioned as a bridge, not a permanent home.
Pragmatism. Tanzania’s first duty is to its people: reliable power, affordable materials, and jobs. Mchuchuma coal can meet those needs in the short- to medium-term. To deny coal entirely would be to deny the fuel that built every industrial economy to date.
Diversification. But coal cannot be the only pillar. It must be balanced with hydropower, natural gas, solar, and eventually new technologies like green hydrogen. This diversification is not a luxury; it is resilience. When rains fail, hydro dips. When LNG markets tighten, gas is costly. When solar fades at night, coal or storage must step in. The point is a balanced mix.
Efficiency and mitigation. If we use coal, it must be the cleanest we can afford. Supercritical boilers, modern emission controls, ash management, and water treatment are not optional extras; they are prerequisites. Investment in pilot projects for carbon capture or reforestation offsets can also soften the carbon footprint while building capacity for future technologies.
Narrative shift. The government’s narrative matters. If coal is framed as a triumphant destination, Tanzania risks reputational harm and financing constraints. If it is framed as a disciplined bridge, necessary today, but limited, with a roadmap to cleaner energy tomorrow, investors, lenders, and citizens are more likely to support it.
Governance and policy choices
For Mchuchuma, the crucial factor is governance.
Integration with national strategy. Policy must specify: how much coal is reserved for Liganga steel, how much for power, and how much for export (if any). Without clarity, the project risks being pulled in different directions, with none succeeding.
Transparency. Environmental impact assessments, resettlement plans, and monitoring reports must be published and updated. Hidden data breeds rumour and resistance. Clear data builds trust.
Community inclusion. Communities in Njombe must see tangible benefits. Jobs, compensation, clinics, roads, and training matter as much as national megawatts. Social licence will determine whether trucks and trains roll peacefully or under protest.
Financing clarity. Global banks are retreating from coal. Financing may depend on domestic banks, Chinese partners, or blended facilities. Government must be honest about who is funding, on what terms, and what contingencies exist if financiers withdraw.
Institutional alignment. Mchuchuma touches multiple ministries, Minerals, Energy, Industry, Finance, Environment. Without a coordinating mechanism, delays will multiply. A cross-ministerial steering council should own the timeline and publish milestones.
Counterarguments and answers
“Coal is obsolete; drop it.”
Coal is declining globally, but in Tanzania’s stage of development, it still fills a gap. The choice is not coal forever; it is coal now, used carefully, while scaling other options.
“Mchuchuma will ruin Tanzania’s green reputation.”
Handled badly, yes. But handled with transparency, efficiency, and a clear transition plan, it can coexist with conservation branding. Tourists accept industrialisation if they see balance.
“Imports of gas or coking coal are better.”
Imports may be cleaner, but they cost foreign exchange and expose Tanzania to volatile global prices. A sovereign cannot build its future entirely on imported fuel.
“Coal plants will become stranded assets.”
Risk is real. Mitigation is possible: design plants flexibly, invest in efficiency, and cap their role at a manageable share of the grid. Pair them with renewables to lengthen relevance.
“Coal crowds out renewables.”
Not if policy is deliberate. Set coal as a capped share of generation, and ringfence investment streams for solar, wind, and storage. The point is a mix, not a monopoly.
The deeper political challenge
Behind all the economics lies politics. Coal appeals to leaders because it is tangible. A lump of coal in hand is proof of energy independence, a photograph for a rally. Renewable megawatts are harder to display. That symbolism gives coal disproportionate weight in political discourse.
But politics of immediacy can sabotage economics of endurance. If Mchuchuma is oversold as the magic solution, expectations will inflate, projects will be rushed, and when problems emerge, the backlash will be severe. The real test is whether leaders can discipline the narrative: to present coal as one tool among many, not as the saviour of all.
It also demands honesty about trade-offs. Communities can accept dust if jobs arrive. Citizens can accept tariffs if power is stable. Investors can accept coal if a transition plan is credible. What none will accept is being misled.
Coal in a climate-conscious century
Mchuchuma is a paradox in black and white. In one hand it is promise: firm power, fuel for steel, cargo for rail, jobs in Njombe. In the other it is risk: pollution, stranded assets, climate pressure, reputational cost.
The choice before Tanzania is not whether coal is “good” or “bad.” It is whether we can use it wisely, as a bridge to build the infrastructure and industry we need now, while designing the pathway to greener energy for tomorrow.
Coal must not be our destination. It must be our transition. If Mchuchuma becomes the fuel that allows Tanzania to industrialise and then evolve, it will be remembered as a disciplined step forward. If it becomes a symbol of triumphalist lock-in, it will trap us in yesterday’s world. The test is governance, transparency, and honesty. In a climate-conscious century, coal cannot be everything. But managed with discipline, it can still be something, a black rock that helps us forge a more balanced future.
