Here is a comprehensive analysis of the human rights case filed by Boniface Mwangi and Agather Atuhaire against Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, and the East African Community (EAC) at the EACJ, based on the provided sources:
Case Overview.
Human rights defenders **Boniface Mwangi (Kenya)** and “Agather Atuhaire (Uganda)”, alongside seven civil society organizations and legal associations, filed a landmark case at the “East African Court of Justice (EACJ)”. They allege unlawful abduction, torture, and expulsion by Tanzanian authorities in May 2025 while observing the treason trial of opposition figure “Tundu Lissu”.
Key Allegations.
1. Human Rights Violations:
– The activists were “abducted from a Dar es Salaam hotel” by unidentified agents, subjected to “torture (including gender-based abuse)”, and forcibly expelled to Kenya/Uganda borders without legal justification.
– They were “never informed of the charges” against them or the authority behind their detention.
2. Legal Basis:
– The actions violate Tanzania’s obligations under:
– The “African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights” (ratified by Tanzania).
– “EAC Treaty principles” on democracy, rule of law, and human rights .
Legal Demands.
The plaintiffs seek:
1. “Public Apologies” from all three governments (Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda).
2. “$1 Million Compensation” per activist (≈ “TZS 2.6 billion” based on current exchange rates ).
3. “Condemnation Declaration” by the EAC against the violations.
4. “Binding Orders” to prevent future abuses.
Defendants & Institutional Context.
| No. | Defendant. | Role/Accountability. |
| 1.0 | Attorney Generals. | Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda (accused of direct complicity) |
| 2.0 | EAC Secretary-General. | Failure to uphold community human rights standards. |
| 3.0 | African Commission on Human Rights (ACHPR). | Guardian of the African Human Rights Charter. |
Regional Implications.
– Test for EACJ:
This case challenges the court’s capacity to hold member states accountable for rights violations. The EAC has historically focused on **trade integration** (e.g., 2016 EPA negotiations ) but faces criticism for ignoring human rights crises.
– Regional Solidarity:
The collaboration between Kenyan/Ugandan activists and Tanzanian civil groups signals cross-border pressure for justice.
Broader Context of Repression.
– Boniface Mwangi’s Recent Arrest:
On July 19, 2025, Kenyan police detained Mwangi for alleged “terrorism financing” during Gen-Z protests. Critics condemn this as a “politically motivated tactic” to silence dissent.
– Tanzania’s Crackdown:
The expulsion aligns with Tanzania’s pattern of targeting rights observers, notably during high-profile trials like Lissu’s.
Significance.
This case is a “watershed moment” for regional human rights enforcement. If the EACJ rules in favor of the activists, it could:
– Set precedents for transboundary accountability.
– Force EAC institutions to prioritize human rights alongside economic agendas.
– Expose systemic repression in Tanzania and test regional commitments to democratic ideals.
Enforcement of EACJ may be tricky!
The East African Court of Justice (EACJ) lacks direct enforcement mechanisms, but Boniface Mwangi, Agather Atuhaire, and their co-applicants can pursue compensation through “multi-layered strategies” leveraging legal, political, and diplomatic avenues. Here’s how:
⚖️ 1. Enforcement via National Courts.
– Registration of EACJ Judgments:
Under Article 44 of the EAC Treaty and Order 39 of the EACJ Rules, EACJ decisions can be registered and enforced in national courts of member states. If Tanzania refuses to pay, the applicants could:
– Register the judgment in “Kenya or Uganda” (their home countries, which are co-respondents for failing consular protection).
– Seek enforcement through local mechanisms (e.g., attachment of Tanzanian state assets like bank accounts or property within Kenya/Uganda).
– Precedent:
Similar regional courts (e.g., ECOWAS) have seen judgments enforced domestically despite initial state resistance.
🌍 2. Political and Diplomatic Pressure.
– EAC Summit Intervention:
The EAC Treaty (Article 146) empowers the Summit of Heads of State to sanction non-compliant members. The applicants demand a “special summit” to address this case, which could trigger fines, suspension of Tanzania’s EAC voting rights, or other penalties.
– Diplomatic Leverage:
Kenya and Uganda (as co-respondents) face reputational risks. Public pressure could compel them to pay compensation upfront and seek reimbursement from Tanzania.
⛓️ 3. African Human Rights Mechanisms.
– African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights:
The applicants plan parallel cases here. If the EACJ ruling is ignored, the African Court’s binding judgments could amplify pressure. Tanzania recognizes the African Court’s jurisdiction, making enforcement more feasible.
– UN Human Rights Council:
The case has already been raised here. Continued scrutiny could lead to sanctions or aid suspensions against Tanzania.
💰 4. Asset Seizure and Financial Sanctions.
– Targeting Assets Abroad:
If compensation is awarded, the applicants could:
– Identify Tanzanian state assets (e.g., embassy properties, commercial holdings) in partner countries.
– Seek court orders for seizure in jurisdictions with strong rule of law (e.g., EU or US).
– Third-Party Funding:
CSOs like the Pan African Lawyers Union could secure advance compensation via litigation funding agreements, repaid upon successful asset recovery.
📢 5. Advocacy and Institutional Reforms.
– Conditional Aid/Benefits:
The EAC could freeze Tanzania’s benefits (e.g., common market access) until compliance. Donors like the EU and US (which condemned the torture) may link aid to compensation.
– Public Shaming:
Ongoing media campaigns (e.g., US International Woman of Courage award for Atuhaire) isolate Tanzania diplomatically.
– Demanded Reforms:
The case seeks “institutional reforms” (e.g., independent oversight of security agencies). These could include compensation funds financed by EAC levies.
📜 Key Precedents and Challenges.
– Katabazi Case:
EACJ’s landmark ruling against Uganda for illegal detentions saw eventual compliance after regional pressure.
– Hurdles:
Tanzania may claim sovereignty or dispute facts, but EACJ’s reliance on the “EAC Treaty” (Articles 6(d), 7(2)) and the “African Charter” makes violations indisputable.
Conclusion.
While enforcement remains challenging, the “combined legal-diplomatic strategy”—anchored in national courts, EAC political tools, and global advocacy—creates pathways for compensation. Success hinges on sustained pressure from co-applicants (e.g., East Africa Law Society) and international allies to transform the EACJ’s moral authority into tangible justice .
Enforcement Of Registered EACJ Rulings In Home Countries.
Based on the legal frameworks, here’s how victims could potentially seize Tanzania’s assets in other EAC member states to enforce EACJ rulings, following registration of the judgment domestically:
⚖️ 1. Legal Pathway for Asset Seizure.
– Registration Precedes Enforcement:
Before any asset seizure, the EACJ judgment must first be registered as a domestic judgment in the enforcing country (e.g., Kenya or Uganda) under Article 44 of the EAC Treaty and national civil procedure laws . Once registered, it carries the same force as a local court judgment.
– Targeting Commercial Assets:
Tanzanian state assets classified as “commercial” (e.g., embassy bank accounts for non-diplomatic activities, state-owned enterprise assets, or investment properties) are vulnerable to seizure. Sovereign immunity typically does not shield assets used for commercial purposes under international law principles.
🌍 2. Country-Specific Enforcement Mechanisms.
– Kenya:
– Registered judgments can be enforced via the “Civil Procedure Act” (Cap 21) and “Rules (2010)”.
– Methods include:
– “Attachment and sale” of Tanzanian government bank accounts or property (e.g., rental income from Tanzanian-owned buildings).
– “Appointment of receivers” to manage seized assets.
– Uganda:
– Similar to Kenya, but requires registration under Uganda’s civil procedure laws. No direct REFJA-equivalent limitations apply since Uganda is an EAC member.
– South Africa:
– Requires a “fresh lawsuit” under common law (not REFJA), treating the EACJ judgment as evidence of debt (“Afriglobal Commodities” precedent).
– “Punitive damages” are unenforceable, and “ministerial consent” (Trade and Industry) is mandatory.
🛡️ 3. Overcoming State Immunity Barriers.
– Commercial Activity Exception:
Assets used for trade (e.g., Tanzanian Central Bank accounts funding commercial projects) lose immunity protection. Precedents in international law support such seizures. Air Tanzania aeroplanes flying outside Tanzania will be vulnerable to seizure to enforce court awards.
– Diplomatic Immunity Safeguards:
Embassies, military assets, and cultural properties remain protected. Seizure efforts must meticulously distinguish between commercial and sovereign assets.
⚠️ 4. Practical Challenges.
– Asset Identification:
Locating and proving the commercial nature of Tanzanian assets abroad requires investigative resources (e.g., subpoenaing bank records).
– Political Interference:
States may invoke “national interest” to block seizures, as seen in South Africa’s “Protection of Business Act”
– Time and Cost:
Enforcement via fresh lawsuits (e.g., in non-REFJA countries) can take years, as seen in “Afriglobal Commodities v. Nesch Mintech”.
💡 5. Strategic Workarounds.
– Leverage EAC Institutions:
Pressure the EAC Summit to impose sanctions (e.g., suspending Tanzania’s voting rights) for non-compliance, indirectly compelling payment.
– Third-Party Asset Discovery:
Collaborate with international banks or entities holding Tanzanian assets to identify attachable accounts.
– Cross-Border Insolvency Proceedings:
If Tanzania defaults on commercial debts, initiate insolvency proceedings against its entities abroad to force asset liquidation.
Key Precedents and Limitations Table.
| No. | Country. | Enforcement Law/Treaty. | Asset Seizure Allowed? | Major Limitations. |
| 1.0 | Kenya. | EAC Treaty, Art. 44 + Civil Procedure Act. | Yes (commercial assets). | 6–12 year limitation period. |
| 2.0 | Uganda. | EAC Treaty + Domestic CPC. | Yes (similar to Kenya). | Requires high court registration. |
| 3.0 | South Africa. | Common law (no REFJA coverage). | Only after a fresh suit. | Ministerial consent; no punitive damages. |
| 4.0 | Tanzania. | REFJA (limited countries). | No (as defendant). | Only UK/commonwealth judgments are enforceable. |
Conclusion.
While “Tanzanian commercial assets in Kenya/Uganda” can be seized post-registration, success hinges on meticulous legal strategies and overcoming sovereign immunity claims. In non-EAC states (e.g., South Africa), enforcement is possible but protracted. Victims should prioritize asset-rich EAC jurisdictions and leverage political pressure alongside legal avenues.
If African Courts Are Ineffective To Enforce EACJ Rulings Can The New York AND Canadian Courts Be Helpful?
The effectiveness of Canadian and New York courts in enforcing East African Court of Justice (EACJ) rulings depends on complex legal principles, jurisdictional limitations, and practical barriers. Here is a structured analysis:
⚖️ 1. Legal Pathways for Enforcement.
– Common Law Recognition (Canada):
Canadian courts *can* recognize foreign judgments under common law principles if:
– The originating court had proper jurisdiction.
– The judgment is final and for a fixed sum.
– No defenses like fraud or due process violations exist.
However, EACJ rulings often declare state conduct unlawful without monetary awards, complicating enforcement. For example, a declaratory judgment condemning Tanzania for torture lacks executable financial terms under Canadian common law.
– Reciprocal Enforcement Statutes:
Canadian provinces (e.g., Ontario, British Columbia) have legislation for streamlined enforcement of judgments from “reciprocating jurisdictions.” “No EAC member state is designated as reciprocating”, forcing reliance on costly common law lawsuits . New York similarly lacks reciprocity agreements with EAC states.
– New York Convention (Arbitral Awards Only):
The Convention facilitates cross-border enforcement of “arbitral awards”, not court judgments. If the EACJ acted as an arbitral tribunal (per Article 32 of the EAC Treaty), awards “might” qualify. However:
– EACJ human rights cases are judicial, not arbitral.
– Canadian courts enforce only awards from commercial disputes, excluding human rights rulings.
🛡️ 2. Jurisdictional Barriers.
– State Immunity:
Both Canada and the U.S. shield foreign state assets under sovereign immunity laws. Tanzania’s bank accounts, property, or diplomatic assets would be untouchable unless linked to “commercial activities” (e.g., a Tanzanian state-owned business in Canada). Proving this exception is exceptionally difficult.
– Public Policy Exceptions:
Canadian courts may reject enforcement if contrary to “public policy.” While torture violates international norms, courts hesitate to rule on foreign state conduct deemed “sovereign“.
– Repackaging EACJ Rulings:
Victims could file new lawsuits in Canada/U.S. using EACJ judgments as “evidence” of liability. However, this demands relitigating facts—a costly and time-intensive process.
⏳ 3. Practical Challenges.
– Asset Identification:
Locating Tanzanian commercial assets abroad requires investigative resources. Central banks and embassy properties are typically immune.
– Political Resistance:
Tanzania may retaliate diplomatically or legally, arguing extraterritorial overreach.
– Costs and Delays:
Canadian enforcement cases (e.g., “Lonking China v. Zhao”) take years, with legal fees exceeding potential compensation.
🌐 4. Alternative Strategies.
– African Human Rights Mechanisms:
Pair EACJ rulings with cases before the **African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights** (which Tanzania recognizes). Its judgments carry greater regional legitimacy.
– Diplomatic Pressure:
Leverage EAC Summit sanctions (e.g., suspending Tanzania’s voting rights) or bilateral aid conditionality from donors like the EU.
– Asset Seizure in Partner States:
Target Tanzanian assets in Kenya/Uganda—where EACJ judgments are registrable under domestic civil procedure laws—rather than distant jurisdictions.
💎 Conclusion.
Canadian and New York courts offer “limited utility” for enforcing EACJ rulings due to jurisdictional barriers, immunity doctrines, and the non-arbitral nature of EACJ decisions.
Victims should prioritize:
1. Regional pressure via EAC political organs.
2. Parallel cases before the African Court.
3. Asset recovery in EAC states with enforceable registration regimes (e.g., Kenya).
While transnational enforcement remains theoretically possible, its success hinges on rare alignment of legal and political factors.
Read more analysis by Rutashubanyuma Nestory
