Like it or not income disparities is on furious ascendant in Tanzania and those who are privileged enough to be inducted in the “Hall of Millionaires” club tend to be in CCM “who is who” list raising disturbing questions about how access to state power has enriched a very few Tanzanians while subjecting the majority into the penury of the abyss.
Patronage systems that grew during the Mkapa reign under the privatization policies have benefited a coterie of very few indeed while leaving the rest to eke out a living under tenuous circumstances. Tanzania millionaires, unlike their Chinese counterparts, have failed to generate new technologies inescapable for job creations.
A new class of Tanzania millionaires is either in speculative ventures like hoarding huge tracts of land in a hope of ensnaring a serious foreign investor to hook up with them. That kind of business transaction turns them into instant millionaires. Well entrenched patronage system of “carrot and stick” has permitted a few well placed individuals to own bogus shares with foreign investors in areas of mining, banking, smartphone operations, farming and many amore.
They are also adept in nailing government filth tenders without having the qualifications only to hand over to the qualified firms for a sizable fee. Sometimes they get paid for the nominal of the services poorly attended, and even CAG reports don’t affect their modus operandis!
The question quickly comes to mind when there is a tripartite contract where there is a large foreign investor and two other local investors. One normally is parastatal and the other much smaller whose corporate ownership remains murky and clouded in secrecy.
Who is this smaller shareholder and how was he identified? Was a procurement act adhered to a fault? The answer usually is in negativity. That is how many of a new class of Tanzania millionaires has mushroomed. Since they have not hailed from business lineage they tend to sit on their false laurels rather than take risks to multiply them and benefit the majority.
You will never hear them stepping a foot in the digital world where most new wealth subsists but keep on grazing on conventional fields of wealth creation like fixed deposits, buying government bonds, and other less risky ventures. It narrates why tackling joblessness is not in the calculus of the very rich.
Do Tanzania’s millionaires qualify as Oligarchs?
The concentration of wealth among CCM-affiliated elites in Tanzania, amid pervasive poverty, reveals a complex system of “political patronage, state-captured economic opportunities, and speculative rent-seeking”. This analysis examines the mechanisms enabling this disparity, drawing on verified sources.
⚖️ I. Political Patronage as Wealth Catalyst.
1. Privatization & Asset Transfers:
Under President Mkapa’s market liberalization (1995–2005), state enterprises were sold at “bargain prices” to politically connected individuals. NMB Bank’s transformation—from 95 branches to 228 with 780 ATMs post-privatization —exemplifies how insiders turned public assets into private fortunes. An NMB executive acknowledged: “It is due to [Mkapa’s] policy that we now stand tall“.
2. Party-Controlled Resources:
CCM’s institutional dominance enables preferential access to:
– Land:
Speculative hoarding of tracts for future investor partnerships.
– Contracts:
“Filth tenders” awarded to unqualified intermediaries who subcontract for hefty fees, despite audit red flags.
– Regulatory Leverage:
Weak media ownership rules allow conglomerates like IPP Media (founded by CCM-aligned billionaire Reginald Mengi) to dominate print/TV/radio, amplifying pro-CCM narratives.
💰 II. Economic Behaviors of the New Elite.
– Speculative Ventures:
Wealth derives from rent-seeking (land banking, mining concessions) rather than productive innovation. Unlike Vietnam (98% millionaire growth) or China’s tech-driven billionaires, Tanzania’s elites avoid high-risk sectors like digital tech.
– Opaque Equity Structures:
Tripartite deals involving foreign investors, state entities, and shadowy local partners—e.g., mining joint ventures where “smaller shareholders” lack procurement transparency.
Mohammed Dewji’s MeTL Group (3.5% of GDP) expanded via privatized industries, yet its political ties enabled market monopolies.
Mwadui diamond, Tanzanite, gold & gas drilling and extraction deals have created lopsided wealth distribution that have failed to benefit a nation but very few indeed. It explains why the regime keeps urging the hoi polloi to pay income and sales taxes since collection rates of natural resources extracts atr abysmal.
With Tanzania’s riches there should have been a social welfare safe net to protect the poor, the elderly and homeless children. However, that chunk of assignment is consigned to development partners and NGOs. The government excused herself: it is broke while swimming in a pond with the filthy rich!
– Capital Preservation:
Elite wealth remains in low-risk assets (government bonds, real estate), not job-creating enterprises. SMEs generate 50% of Africa’s jobs but receive minimal elite investment.
Table: Wealth Concentration Mechanisms.
No. | Mechanism. | Example. | Impact. |
1.0 | Privatization. | NMB Bank sale. | Bank now dominates retail finance; profits privatized. |
2.0 | Media Control. | PP Group’s cross-sector dominance. | Shapes public opinion; limits scrutiny. |
3.0 | Shadow Shareholding. | Mining JVs with unnamed locals. | Wealth funneled to politically shielded actors. |
🏛️ III. Institutional Reinforcement.
– CCM’s Expansion:
Membership surged from 3.6M to 12.1M (2024) via digitized recruitment, strengthening patronage networks. The party distributes vehicles to regional offices to “deepen grassroots reach,” ensuring loyalty. However that list is also mired in controversy of whether it has ever been updated since CCM was created on February 05th 1977. It is quietly alleged Nyerere the founder of CCM is still the holder of CCM card No. 1. If that is true, the CCM claim of 13 million or so members is a mishmash of living, dead and absconded members. It has never updated to remove those who are dead or have joined other political parties
– Legal Barriers:
The 2018 Online Content Regulations suppress media scrutiny, while the Statistics Act restricts publication of ownership data without state approval.
– Election Control:
CCM’s 2020 landslide (84% presidential vote) occurred amid opposition repression, entrenching elite access.
🌍 IV. Social & Economic Consequences.
– Digital Divide:
While Tanzania launches advanced systems like TIPS (processing 490M transactions in 2024), wealth remains concentrated among analog-era elites.
– Oligarchic Traits:
Dewji (net worth: $1.8B) and Mengi exemplify oligarchy: wealth fused with political power, limited innovation, and capital flight. Unlike Chinese millionaires who drive technology exports, Tanzania’s elites rely on import-export monopolies.
– Poverty Entrenchment:
65.7M mobile money accounts exist, yet rural connectivity gaps persist. Elite wealth stagnation (in bonds/land) fails to address unemployment.
Table: Elite vs. National Economic Priorities.
No. | National Initiatives. | Elite Investment Focus. | Disconnect. |
1.0 | Digital Economy Framework 2024–2034. | Land banking, mining speculation. | Elite capital avoids tech/job creation. |
2.0 | TIPS (financial inclusion). | Government bonds, fixed deposits. | Wealth preservation > risk innovation. |
3.0 | SME support policies. | Hoarding state tenders. | Crowds out competitive SMEs. |
🔮 V. Conclusion: Oligarchy by Patronage.
Tanzania’s millionaires “are emergent oligarchs”, leveraging CCM ties to monopolize rent streams while avoiding productive investment. Unlike Asian “common prosperity” models, Tanzania exhibits “extractive capitalism”, where elite wealth amplifies political control—not broad growth. The $145M smart-city surveillance project symbolizes this priority: securing elite interests over generating inclusive opportunity. Without transparency in contracts, media, and party financing, disparities will deepen.
Read more analysis by Rutashubanyuma Nestory