We built the train. It runs sleek, fast, and on schedule. From Dar es Salaam to Morogoro, then to Makutupora, and soon beyond. A marvel of infrastructure, the SGR is what decades of policy dreams are made of: a signal that Tanzania is serious about logistics, trade, and regional leadership.
But behind the celebration, something is missing, literally. Cargo. The very freight the railway was designed to carry often fails to show up in the expected volumes. Wagons depart half-full. Inland ports sit quiet.
It’s an uncomfortable truth: we are running a world-class railway in an economy that has yet to produce world-class freight volume. The problem isn’t the track. It’s the ecosystem around it. And this disconnect between infrastructure and its utility may become the defining challenge of Tanzania’s transport future.
Domestic Cargo Constraints — The Myth of Internal Demand
When the SGR was conceived, optimism ran high. It was assumed that Tanzania’s growing agricultural output, its industrialization drive, and expanded extractive sectors would supply more than enough domestic cargo. That assumption hasn’t materialized.
The country’s productive base, though evolving, remains thinly spread. Agro-processing is still rudimentary. Export crops are largely routed via road due to the need for flexibility. Factories, where they exist, are not yet rail-integrated. In many regions, the nearest production clusters are kilometers from the nearest SGR station, with no last-mile links.
Take the example of inland container depots or dry ports. Many remain underutilized because their catchment areas lack the production density needed to generate steady cargo volumes. Even major grain-producing regions aren’t yet linked to formal aggregation centers feeding into the rail.
This isn’t a flaw in the rail itself, it’s a reflection of structural economic realities. We overestimated the immediate freight capacity of the domestic economy. And in doing so, we risked designing a corridor without a current.
The Private Sector’s Cold Shoulder
Ask private logistics players why they aren’t rushing to use the existing railway lines, and the answer is rarely about ideology. It’s about friction.
Many report challenges with scheduling, unpredictable timetables, and complex booking processes. The promise of rail that it’s cheaper and faster hasn’t translated into reliability or flexibility. Unlike trucking, where you can call a driver and move within hours, the TRC often requires early booking, bulk volumes, and coordination with other actors like TPA and TRA, each with their delays.
Traders, especially in fast-moving goods or time-sensitive cargo, can’t afford that uncertainty. They choose trucks not out of preference, but out of necessity.
Moreover, there’s a trust deficit. The SGR remains a government-run service, and the private sector, particularly in Tanzania, is wary of state-administered systems that lack customer responsiveness or redress mechanisms. Without streamlined user interfaces, real-time cargo tracking, and dedicated business support teams, adoption will lag.
Until the railway earns the trust of its primary clients, the cargo owners, it will remain an option of last resort. And empty wagons will continue to roll.
Unrealized Regional Cargo Dreams
At the heart of Tanzania’s SGR vision was a bold regional proposition: that Rwanda, Burundi, and the eastern DRC would reroute their trade through Dar es Salaam, using the new rail to shorten delivery times, reduce costs, and deepen integration.
But these expectations have met complex realities.
First, regional partners weigh more than route length; they assess reliability. Inconsistent port clearance, customs bottlenecks, and the absence of cross-border harmonization undermine Tanzania’s competitive advantage. Mombasa, despite congestion, has a predictable schedule. Tanzania’s corridor still sends mixed signals.
Second, political and institutional coordination is weak. High-level MoUs with Rwanda have yet to translate into detailed infrastructure alignments. For example, no seamless digital cargo tracking has been implemented across the SGR and partner country border systems. The chain breaks at the weakest link, and right now, there are too many of those links.
Third, without a stable, clear transit regime including guaranteed turnaround times, pricing transparency, and joint dispute resolution, regional traders cannot risk bulk rerouting. They’ll pay more for certainty, even if it means sticking with roads and older ports.
Until Tanzania’s logistics regime becomes a model of trust and efficiency, the region will remain hesitant, and the SGR will remain underbooked.
The Chicken-or-Egg Dilemma: Wait for Cargo or Build for It?
Some defend the current situation as usual. “Build it first,” they argue, “and volume will follow.” This logic infrastructure, as a catalyst, has precedent, but it also carries risk.
In Tanzania’s case, the danger is clear: without parallel investments in production, trade facilitation, and end-to-end logistics, the SGR becomes a fixed asset floating in a weak ecosystem. The train exists, but the conditions for filling it lag.
There is also the question of sequencing. Why did cargo-generating hubs, agro-processing parks, bonded warehouses, and cold storage centers not come first, or at least alongside the rail? Why were road upgrades to feeder zones not prioritized? Why are key customs systems still unlinked to railway movement?
The SGR may indeed be a catalyst, but catalysts require fuel. In this case, the fuel is industrial productivity, agricultural surpluses, and regional trust. Building the track was the easy part. Building what moves on it, that’s the real development challenge.
Rethinking Rail-Centric Growth — A Systemic Policy Pivot Needed
If there’s a lesson here, it is that transport policy cannot live in isolation. The SGR is not merely a railway; it is a logistics proposition, an industrial support system, and a regional integration tool. For it to succeed, it must be embedded within a broader national strategy.
That means aligning industrial parks with railway spurs. It means synchronizing agricultural seasons, aggregation efforts, and market access programs with SGR schedules. It requires dry ports to be not just physical locations but digitally connected, customs-linked gateways.
Policy must also address the pricing puzzle. Current rail tariffs, though often publicized, remain unclear to many users. A single digital portal showing prices, schedules, and booking options would go further than a hundred presidential speeches.
Finally, it’s time to involve the private sector not as passengers, but co-drivers. If they co-design parts of the system from warehousing to service-level standards, adoption will rise. Otherwise, the state will continue building infrastructure that people don’t use.
A Train Without a Load Is Just a Spectacle
It is easy to be dazzled by movement, by the gleaming carriages, the synchronized arrivals, the speeches at launchpads. But a train without a load is not a triumph of logistics. It’s a spectacle. And Tanzania has enough of those.
The SGR was never meant to be a display. It was sold as a shift to a new logistics backbone that would rewire how this country moves goods, creates jobs, and earns revenue. But that promise hinges not on steel and speed, but on flow and freight.
Right now, the system is out of sync. The rail runs ahead of production. Terminals outpace industrial growth. The vision outpaces delivery.
Yet it doesn’t have to end here. The infrastructure exists. The will, at least rhetorically, is present. What’s missing is the alignment of the connective tissue between rail, road, port, warehouse, factory, farm, and border.
We can still get it right. But to do so, we must stop thinking of infrastructure as a standalone win. It must be designed as part of an ecosystem, one that serves users, responds to trade realities, and moves not just trains, but economies.
Until then, every empty wagon is a warning. And every underutilized station is a missed opportunity.
Read more articles by Dr. Wilson Pesabelele