Clipping Presidential Powers, Not Creation of Overlapping Institutions is All We Need!

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CCM conmen and women never fail to amuse me. In every problem they pogoe to create another costly institutional layer to attempt to solve a problem. It is a discursive manner to evade accosting the real causes of institutional failures: an imperial president us our collective bane, period!

If it is corruption, they created Takukuru, or if it is police extrajudicial powers now in CCM Manifesto (2025 – 2030) have dreamt up NBI (National Bureau of Investigations). The idea of mimicking the US FBI is risible!

To our learned friends in the government, the police with too many tasks, and unburdening them will streamline what the police are doing! This is a cunning feint sadly coming at a huge cost. Such damning solutions tell us more about whoever recommended them but don’t provide the solutions we are looking for. It is all bile water, nothing tangible.

Since post independence, most solutions figured out by CCM don’t work because there has never been genuine effort to fix problems. Just imagine the same leaders were the ones who crafted laws that shielded corrupt presidential appointees from facing the rule of law. In those laws, they said presidential appointees were untouchable unless the president decided otherwise! How pathetic!

All security organs, not a single senior officer, face an interview and transparent competition in a transparent manner, and parliamentary ratification. The question becomes under what circumstances the appointing authority zeroed in on to appoint whoever is appointed to run those institutions? That single handedly bred a “culture of sycophancy” that is tormenting us today.

Look at how Takukuru is performing! We have splurged trillions since its creation but is nowhere near to apprehend official graft. Consider another money guzzler that was supposed to deal with illicit drugs, and what is doing right now? What I see is money is gutted but illicit drugs are taking over the fabric of the nation.

CCM Manifesto of (2010-2015) boasted of creating graft courts but where are we with it? It is all hot air and nothing of substance has come out of it. Experiences cited of how Kenya works is different from us. In the Kenyan constitution nobody can be appointed by the then president of Kenya until he has been taken through a competitive, transparent recruitment process. Unlike in Tanzania where the institutions of governance are the President’s exclusive domains.

In Tanzania, presidential powers are abused regularly and that explains why we have security forces that don’t protect the citizens but the rulers of the day. When all security forces right now are hellbent to massively rig the elections in favour of their employers CCM then you should know no matter how you juggle the pack the cards are still the same.

Serious reforms in Tanzania will not start unless everybody is on board with what the Warioba constitutional committee had collated from the contributors: the weaknesses of institutions demand presidential powers to arbitrary appointments revoked, once and for all. Tanzania doesn’t belong to a cabal but to all of us. The systems of governance inherited from colonial days explain why Tanzania is extremely poor, and will never extricate herself from shackles of over-dependence until we come to a logical conclusion of no more presidential appointees.

The president shouldn’t be allowed to choose leaders on our behalf. If we are sane enough to elect the president we are wise enough to elect most of what the president appointees. We can no longer continue to obscure the abuse of presidential appointment powers under the closet of institutional malaise. We must begin to interrogate since independence what have we gained having R.Cs, D.Cs, DEDs, RAS, DAS, IGP, DNI, RSO, DSO RPCs secured in opacity? It is the lack of transparency, competition and verification which narrates why Tanzania is in such a morass.

Why can’t regional administrators be elected by the voters? Why is there no competition, transparency and verification of leaders of public organs? Will they threaten the rights of the electorate if they know who their employer is? Most of the human rights abuses Tanzania is facing today is to protect and defend the archaic appointing presidential powers. Even the torpedoed election laws aim to safeguard the presidential appointment powers which are the main source of the official graft in Tanzania.

Anybody who really cares about Tanzania must appreciate that we are in a new dawn where colonial inherited powers of presidential arbitrary appointments are our doomsday not only in the past but today, and tomorrow. Remove arbitrariness in hiring top government officials then the rule of law and good governance will prevail in earnest.

What am I trying to advocate for?

The core argument I present—that Tanzania’s governance crisis stems from unchecked presidential powers rather than institutional gaps—resonates deeply with current political realities. Below is a structured analysis of why clipping presidential authority is paramount, supported by evidence from Tanzania’s political trajectory and institutional failures.

⚖️ 1. The Illusion of Institutional Solutions.

   – “Takukuru (Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau – PCCB)” and the proposed “National Bureau of Investigations (NBI)” exemplify the regime’s tendency to create costly, overlapping agencies instead of addressing root causes. Despite decades of operation and “trillions” spent, Takukuru has failed to curb elite corruption. As noted in recent reports, anti-graft efforts remain superficial, with corrupt officials shielded by presidential connections.

   – The 2025 CCM manifesto’s NBI proposal—modeled after the U.S. FBI—ignores existing frameworks. Tanzania’s police already hold broad powers; reforms should focus on demilitarizing them and ensuring judicial independence, not adding redundant bodies.

👑 2. Presidential Powers: The Heart of Systemic Failure.

   – Arbitrary Appointments:

Security chiefs (IGP, DNI), regional commissioners (RCs), and senior bureaucrats (DEDs, RAS) are appointed unilaterally by the president without parliamentary oversight. This violates the “Warioba Commission’s collated views” (2014), which demanded competitive, transparent appointments to prevent patronage networks.

   – Accountability Evasion:

Laws protect presidential appointees from prosecution unless the president consents. This explains why no senior official faces consequences for abuses—like the 2024 abductions of opposition figures or electoral sabotage and daylight robbery of public resources.

   – Electoral Manipulation:

The October 2025 elections are already compromised. The NEC (stacked with CCM loyalists) barred the opposition party CHADEMA and automatically disqualified thousands of opposition candidates and their supporters. Security forces openly aid CCM’s rigging efforts, proving they serve the ruler, not citizens.

💸 3. Economic and Social Costs of Centralized Power.

   – Resource Misallocation:

Funds funneled into ineffective agencies (e.g., Takukuru, drug-control units) could modernize agriculture or healthcare. Meanwhile, inflation and unemployment cripple ordinary Tanzanians.

   – Repression as Policy:

Under Samia Suluhu Hassan, Magufuli-era tactics resurfaced: opposition arrests, media bans (e.g., suspensions of “The Citizen”), and extrajudicial killings (e.g., CHADEMA official Ali Mohamed Kibao). Samia’s “4Rs” agenda is undermined by her accommodation of hardliners.

🌍 4. Democratic Alternatives: Lessons from Kenya and Beyond.

   – Kenya’s Model:

The 2010 Kenyan Constitution mandates a transparent and competitive process fumigated with parliamentary vetting for presidential appointees. Tanzania’s refusal to adopt similar measures perpetuates kleptocracy and autocracy.

   – Elected Regional Administrators:

My proposal for elected RCs/DEDs would shift accountability to voters. For example:

     – Ngorongoro/Loliondo Land Conflicts:

State violence against Maasai communities escalated under appointed administrators answerable only to Dodoma.

     – Grassroots Resistance:

Informal worker cooperatives and land-rights movements prove communities can self-govern when freed from top-down notched controls.

📜 5. The Path Forward: Beyond the 2025 Elections.

   – Constitutional Overhaul:

The Warioba Commission’s draft constitution (rejected by CCM) must be revived and reviewed to:

     – Abolish unilateral presidential appointments.

     – Establish independent oversight bodies. (e.g., judiciary, electoral commission).

     – Mandate parliamentary approval for all security chiefs with security of tenure.

   – International Pressure:

Samia’s reliance on foreign investment (FDI surged 21.6% in 2024) makes Tanzania vulnerable to sanctions tied to democratic backsliding.

💎 Conclusion:

Sovereignty scuttled by Presidential Supremacy?

Tanzania’s crisis is not institutional scarcity but “concentrated power inherited from colonialism”. As long as the president controls appointments, security forces, and the electoral machinery, new agencies like the NBI will only deepen repression.

The 2025 elections—already marred by CHADEMA’s exclusion and opposition arrests and false charges —will entrench this system unless citizens and allies demand structural change: “electing administrators, clipping presidential powers, and reclaiming the state for all Tanzanians”.

> “The executive’s penchant for creating institutions is not to solve problems, but to obscure the fact that the problem is the executive itself.” The executive is in denial of failing to live up to the independence ideals.

 — My critique captures the essence of Tanzania’s governance tragedy. The fight is not for more agencies, but for the republic promised at independence.

–📌 Tables for Key Issues.

Table 1: Failed Tanzanian Institutions vs. Democratic Alternatives.

Table 2: Kenya vs. Tanzania Appointment Processes.

Read more analysis by Rutashubanyuma Nestory