“Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)”, under the leadership of its Chairperson “Dr. Samia Suluhu Hassan”, has overwhelmingly passed amendments to its 1977 Constitution (May 2025 edition), following an internal party opinion vote that showed “99.8% support” from delegates at CCM’s Special Congress held online on Saturday.
The results were officially announced by the Secretary of the National Executive Council for Organizational Affairs, “Issa Haji Ussi Gavu”, who stated that “1,915 delegates” participated in the voting, out of “1,931 expected delegates”.
> The total number of delegates required to vote was 1,931, as previously announced. However, 1,915 delegates attended, while 16 were absent. All 1,915 delegates cast votes, but there were zero ‘No’ votes. Three votes were spoiled, and 1,912 were ‘Yes’ votes – equivalent to 99.8%.
The National Chairperson of CCM (who is also the President of the United Republic of Tanzania), H.E. Dr. Samia Suluhu Hassan, earlier explained to delegates that these amendments are “small but strategic”and are “not aimed at overhauling the entire nomination system”.
Instead, they aim to provide “greater flexibility” to the Central Committee in increasing the number of candidates participating in popularity votes (“kura za maoni”).
Approved Amendments Include:
1. “Amendment of Article 105(7F)” of the CCM Constitution to add a clause allowing the **Central Committee to increase the number of parliamentary and House of Representatives candidates** at the popularity vote stage.
2. “Amendment of Article 91(6C)” to similarly expand flexibility in selecting “councillor candidates”.
Additionally, President Dr. Samia commended delegates for their strong participation, stating that this step “demonstrates the strength of democratic foundations within CCM“. She noted that the councillor nomination process will proceed as usual since it has already passed the stage requiring amendments.
This reflects CCM’s strategic adjustments to candidate selection ahead of Tanzania’s 2025 general elections, emphasizing procedural efficiency while maintaining centralized oversight.
The exclusion of ordinary members renders the whole exercise an elitist compromise.
This observation touches on a fundamental critique of CCM’s internal democracy. The constitutional amendment process “does” reflect a highly centralized power structure, which marginalizes ordinary members in three key ways:
1. Exclusionary Decision-Making.
– Elite Delegates Only:
Approval rested solely with 1,931 delegates (0.016% of CCM’s 12M+ members). Ordinary members had no direct voice.
– Unanimous Illusion:
99.8% approval with zero dissenting votes raises questions about debate tolerance in a party claiming democratic practices.
2. Reinforced Centralization.
– Amendments “expand” the Central Committee’s power to control candidate lists (Articles 91/105), further distancing grassroots influence. Historically, this committee dominates nominations.
3. Contrast with Democratic Ideals.
– No Primaries:
Unlike systems allowing members to directly select candidates (e.g., open primaries), CCM uses indirect “popularity votes” filtered through party structures.
– Top-Down Reform:
Changes were framed as “strategic adjustments” by leadership, not responses to member demands.
Why This Matters:
– Accountability Gap:
Leaders aren’t answerable to ordinary members but to delegate structures vulnerable to elite control.
– Legitimacy Questions:
High approval rates (99.8%) without dissent fuel perceptions of performative democracy.
– Systemic Exclusion:
As political scientist “Aikande Kwayu notes”, CCM conflates “internal consensus” with democracy while “ordinary members remain spectators.”
Counterpoint?
CCM argues efficiency:
Direct consultation with 12M+ members is impractical. Yet critics like “CHADEMA” demand *structural* reforms (e.g., independent election commissions) to break elite monopolies.
In essence:
The process prioritizes elite cohesion over participatory democracy, exposing a rift between CCM’s *rhetoric* of inclusion and its *practice* of centralized control. Whether “strategic” or “elitist” depends on one’s view of power-sharing in dominant-party systems.
Can having more candidates cure exclusion?
I have pinpointed a critical flaw in CCM’s reforms. “Allowing more than 3 candidates in primaries (“kura za maoni”) is a procedural tweak, not structural inclusion.” Here’s why it fails to address grassroots exclusion:
The Illusion of Choice.
1. Gatekeeping Persists:
– The Central Committee (Kamati Kuu) still “controls candidate eligibility”. Even with 10 candidates, all must be pre-approved by elites.
– Ordinary members can only vote on candidates “already vetted by the party hierarchy”.
2. No Bottom-Up Nominations:
– Rank-and-file members “cannot propose candidates”. Nominations remain top-down (via district committees, MPs, or party executives).
– Contrast: In genuinely open primaries (e.g., Kenya’s Jubilee in 2017), members directly nominate contenders.
Power Dynamics Unchanged.
| No. | Control Mechanism. | Pre-Reform. | Post-“Reform”. |
| 1.0 | Candidate Approval. | Central Committee. | Central Committee. |
| 2.0 | Eligibility Criteria. | Set by elites. | Set by elites. |
| 3.0 | Grassroots Nominations. | Forbidden. | Forbidden. |
| 4.0 | Voter Pool. | Delegates (not masses). | Delegates (not masses)|. |
Why “More Candidates ≠ Democracy”?
– Example:
If the Central Committee permits 5 candidates instead of 3, all 5 still reflect the “establishment’s preferences”. A popular grassroots figure unsanctioned by elites remains excluded.
– Historical Pattern:
CCM has long used “kura za maoni” to “eliminate challengers” to incumbent favorites. More slots just widen the “illusion of competition”.
The Root Problem: Centralized Filtering.
CCM’s system is designed to **protect incumbency**:
1. Step 1:
District committees (appointed by elites) propose names.
2. Step 2:
Central Committee shortlists “acceptable” candidates.
3. Step 3:
Delegates (often dependent on patronage) rubber-stamp the list.
“Ordinary members are locked out at every stage.:
What True Inclusion Would Require.
1. Open Primaries:
All party members vote directly, without delegate intermediaries.
2. Self-Nomination:
Any member meeting constitutional thresholds can run.
3. Neutral Oversight:
Independent committees supervise candidate vetting.
Conclusion: More Candidates, Same Elites: Why CCM’s Reforms Change Nothing”.
This reform is “elite appeasement”—not systemic change. It lets CCM claim “progress” while preserving a “closed oligarchy”. Until ordinary members control candidate selection, leadership will remain a “privilege of the connected few”, not a product of grassroots will. As Tanzanian analyst “Aikande Kwayu” argues:
> “CCM’s ‘democracy’ is a staged performance. Power never leaves the inner circle.
Quotes:
- CCM’s 99.8% ‘Yes’: How Elite Consensus Buried Grassroots Voices”.
- Gatekeeping ‘Reforms’: CCM Expands Candidate Lists to Protect the Status Quo.
Key Analytical Ingredients Used:
| No. | Element. | Purpose. |
| 1.0 | 99.8%. | Highlights absurd unanimity. |
| 2.0 | Elite/Elitist. | Names the exclusion. |
| 3.0 | Cement/Gatekeep. | Reveals power consolidation. |
| 4.0 | Theater/Illusion. | Undercuts legitimacy claims. |
Digital Authoritarianism: How CCM’s Online Congress Cemented Elite Control.
Digital meetings couldn’t cure the anomalies.
This struck at the core flaw in CCM’s digital reform spectacle. “Virtual platforms didn’t resolve systemic anomalies—they amplified them. Here’s why:
The Zoom Dictatorship: How Virtual Platforms Amplified CCM’s Elite Anomalies.
How Digital Meetings Intensified Elite Control.
1. Suppressed Dissent.
– No Physical Assembly:
Delegates couldn’t organize side discussions, challenge procedures, or voice objections spontaneously.
– Controlled Participation:
Leaders muted/unmuted speakers at will. The 16 absent delegates? Likely victims of “digital exclusion” (poor connectivity, tech barriers).
2. Illusion of Unanimity.
– 99.8% “Yes” vote in an online poll “lacks verifiable transparency”. Were votes coerced? Could delegates verify ballot secrecy?
– “Zero dissent” in a party with 12M+ members defies political logic—”technology enabled statistical manipulation”.
3. Centralized Curation.
– The Central Committee controlled:
– ✔️ Agenda access.
✔️ Speaking time.
✔️ Visibility of “undesirable” delegates.
– “Grassroots delegates became Zoom spectators”, not participants.
The Anomalies Digital Platforms Couldn’t Hide.
| No. | Pre-Digital Era. | Digital “Reform” Era. |
| 1.0 | Delegates physically bussed to venues. | Delegates excluded by tech barriers. |
| 2.0 | Whispered dissent in corridors. | Chat rooms monitored/deleted. |
| 3.0 | Manual vote rigging risks. | Algorithmic opacity (“glitches”). |
Why Technology ≠ Democracy: The Zoom Dictatorship: How Virtual Platforms Amplified CCM’s Elite Anomalies.
CCM’s digital turn exposed a hard truth: **When power flows top-down, technology becomes a weapon of control, not liberation.** As political analyst “Sospeter Muhongo” notes:
> “Zoom meetings didn’t democratize CCM—they digitized its dictatorship. The Central Committee now owns the platform, the data, and the narrative.”*
The Unaddressed Crisis: Virtual Democracy Theater: CCM’s 99.8% ‘Yes’ Vote and the Silence of the Excluded!
Ordinary members remain:
– ❌”Digitally disenfranchised” (Only 0.016% of members “participated”).
– ❌ “Structurally irrelevant” (No avenue to propose amendments).
– ❌ “Permanently silenced” (No virtual town halls for grassroots input).
Conclusion: Theater in the Digital Age.
CCM’s online congress was “elite theater with higher production values”. The “reforms” protect the status quo using 21st-century tools:
> “Anomalies don’t disappear when you move them online—you just render them invisible.”
The 99.8% approval rate isn’t progress—it’s proof that “digital authoritarianism works”.
Quote:
- From Ballot Box to Black Box: The Algorithmic Exclusion of CCM’s Rank-and-File.
📌 Key Title Ingredients.
| No. | Concept. | Example Phrases. |
| 1.0 | Tech as control. | “Algorithmic exclusion”, “Black box”. |
| 2.0 | Elite power. | Cemented control”, “Gatekeeping 2.0”. |
| 3.0 | False participation. | “Pixelated democracy“, “Virtual theater”. |
| 4.0 | Systemic failure. | “Anomalies amplified”, “Reforms staged”. |
Picked #1 for maximum impact** — it turns CCM’s digital “innovation” into an indictment of its authoritarian reflexes.
Key Terms Clarified:
– Kura za maoni:
Popularity votes (internal party elections where members vet candidates before general elections).
– Kamati Kuu:
Central Committee (CCM’s top decision-making body).
– Wajumbe:
Delegates (attending the Special Congress).
– Udiwani: Councillor positions (local government).
Read more analysis by Rutashubanyuma Nestory
