Alptekin Aksoy was a 52-year-old Tanzanian citizen of Turkish origin who was tragically killed on July 18, 2025 by unidentified individuals in Dar es Salaam’s Kinondoni area. The police are currently investigating the incident.
The killing of Turkish-Tanzanian businessman Alptekin Aksoy in Dar es Salaam, presents conflicting evidence regarding motives. Based on the available information, “the attack appears more consistent with a targeted assassination linked to a “personal/family dispute” or “Turkish political spillover” or “pure robbery” or a combination of those factors. This discourse attempts to explore possible murder motives and make its own contribution to the debate.
Besides, the execution had also sparked a debate whether lack of a complete CCTV coverage in Dar-es-Salaam may be thwarting the criminal investigation. Here’s a breakdown of key factors:
🔍 1. Contradictory Robbery Evidence.
– No Theft Reported:
Multiple witnesses and police confirmed nothing was stolen from Aksoy (e.g., phone, wallet, car remained intact), undermining robbery as a primary motive. Since it was Sunday with most Banks closed it is very unlikely he was carrying large sums of money to attract such type of heist and murder. If money was a motive, the gunmen would have demanded cash and once received they would have departed without fuss. This was planned execution.
– Conflicting Claims:
One report suggested assailants took an item from the car boot, but this lacks corroboration and conflicts with official police statements.
🎯 2. Evidence of Targeted Assassination.
– Professional Execution:
Security footage showed attackers arriving precisely as Aksoy parked, using a Kalashnikov at close range, firing a second shot to ensure death, and fleeing efficiently—indicating meticulous planning.
A second bullet points to a personal grudge of the mastermind of his assassination. Those who actually finished him off appear like “hired guns.”
🇹🇷 3. Limited Evidence of Turkish Political Motives.
– No Direct Ties to Turkish Conflicts:
Despite Aksoy’s dual citizenship, no reports link him to Turkish political factions (e.g., Gülenists) or domestic Turkish disputes. His businesses (generator sales, construction) lacked overt political dimensions.
– Tanzanian Context Overrides:
Tanzania’s history of unresolved contract killings and abductions (e.g., opposition figure Ali Kibao’s murder weeks earlier) points to localized violence rather than international spillover.
🌍 4. Tanzania’s Broader Security Climate.
– Rising Ambiguous Violence:
Police acknowledged “unexplained killings” and enforced disappearances, creating an environment where professional hits are plausible.
– Political Violence Patterns:
Recent abductions of opposition figures (e.g., Chadema members) involved similar methods—armed assailants, motorcycles, and targeted removals—but these targeted politicians, not businessmen.
💎 Conclusion.
The evidence strongly points to a “personal motive, likely tied to Aksoy’s high-stakes businesses”, given the timing, lack of robbery, and professional execution style. While Turkish politics cannot be entirely ruled out without a full investigation, no credible links exist in available reports. Tanzanian authorities are treating this as a planned homicide, with police pursuing “all leads“
Key Details of the Attack.
| No. | Aspect. | Details. |
| 1.0 | Date & Time. | July 18, 2025, ~11:30 AM (local time). |
| 2.0 | Location. | Makaburini, Kinondoni District, Dar es Salaam. |
| 3.0 | Method. | Two masked assailants on a motorcycle; AK-47 used at point-blank range. |
| 4.0 | Victim Profile. | | 52-year-old philanthropist, & generator business owner. |
| 5.0 | Investigation Status. | Ongoing; police reviewing security footage and witness accounts. |
Turkish Politics Spilling Over In Tanzania?
The potential for Turkish political tensions to spill over into Tanzania, particularly regarding the Feza Schools issue, involves complex diplomatic, economic, and ideological factors. Here is a structured analysis:
⚖️ 1. Historical Context: Feza Schools Dispute.
– In 2017, Turkish President Erdoğan personally urged Tanzanian President Magufuli to shut down or transfer ownership of “Feza Schools” (11 institutions in Tanzania), accusing them of links to Fethullah Gülen’s movement (labeled “FETÖ,” a terrorist organization by Turkey). Erdoğan claimed FETÖ posed a global threat, citing its alleged role in Turkey’s 2016 coup attempt.
– Tanzania initially “resisted Turkey’s demands”. Foreign Minister Augustine Mahiga stated no evidence linked Feza Schools to terrorism, and the school management (joint Tanzanian-Turkish trust) denied ties to Gülen. Magufuli’s government prioritized legal due process and the schools’ educational contributions.
🌍 2. Current Turkish Political Dynamics.
– Crackdown on Opposition:
Turkey’s largest opposition party (CHP) faces turmoil, with popular leader Ekrem İmamoğlu imprisoned since March 2025. This follows Erdoğan’s broader erosion of democratic institutions since 2016, including judiciary manipulation.
– International Pressure:
The EU criticizes Turkey’s authoritarian shift but hesitates to impose sanctions due to strategic dependencies (e.g., refugee management, NATO security). This emboldens Turkey to extend its anti-FETÖ campaigns abroad.
⚠️ 3. Spillover Risks in Tanzania.
– Renewed Diplomatic Pressure:
Turkey has previously succeeded in transferring Gülen-linked schools in Guinea, Niger, and Somalia. With Tanzania’s Feza issue unresolved, Turkey may leverage ongoing economic partnerships (e.g., funding Tanzania’s Central Railway) to reignite demands.
– Authoritarian Alignment:
Magufuli’s government (2015–2021) shared Erdoğan’s disdain for dissent, using nationalist rhetoric and suppressing opposition. Current Tanzanian leaders might similarly prioritize “stability” over human rights, aligning with Turkey’s framing of FETÖ as a security threat.
– Economic Vulnerabilities:
Tanzania relies on Turkish investment (e.g., $150M trade ties, infrastructure projects). If Turkey ties further aid to compliance, Tanzania could reconsider Feza’s status despite earlier resistance.
🛡️ 4. Mitigating Factors.
– Tanzanian Sovereignty:
Past resistance to Turkey’s demands reflects Tanzania’s commitment to independent legal processes. Feza Schools remain popular for academic quality, serving 3,000+ students, strengthening domestic support.
– Global Scrutiny:
Turkey’s imprisonment of İmamoğlu has drawn international condemnation. Tanzania may face reputational risks if seen capitulating to Ankara’s agenda.
💎 Conclusion.
Turkish political pressures “could spill over” into Tanzania, especially if economic incentives or security narratives gain traction. However, Tanzania’s historical pushback and institutional safeguards may limit direct impacts. The outcome hinges on whether Turkey escalates demands post-election and how Tanzania balances sovereignty against strategic interests.
The Murder of South African Elephant Conservationist Wayne Lotter Reignited.
The assassination of South African elephant conservationist Wayne Lotter in Dar es Salaam in 2017 exhibits characteristics consistent with contract killings, suggesting the potential existence of “guns for hire” networks in Tanzania. Here’s a synthesis of key evidence and contextual factors from the search results:
🔫 1. Lotter’s Assassination: Indicators of a Professional Hit.
– Methodology:
Lotter was ambushed on August 16, 2017, shortly after leaving Julius Nyerere International Airport. Gunmen blocked his taxi, opened the door, and shot him execution-style before fleeing with his laptop. The precision assault suggests premeditated tracking and coordination.
– Context:
As co-founder of PAMS Foundation, Lotter had dismantled major ivory trafficking syndicates, leading to over 2,000 poacher arrests and an 80% conviction rate for Tanzania’s anti-poaching unit. He received repeated death threats, indicating his work threatened powerful criminal interests.
– Investigation Status:
Wayne Lotter, a renowned South African conservationist, was tragically murdered on August 16, 2017, in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, while traveling in a taxi. His killers were later sentenced to death.
The Investigation and Trial:
– Initially, 22 suspects were arrested in connection with Lotter’s murder.
– 11 suspects were later acquitted, leaving 11 individuals to face trial.
– The High Court of Tanzania found the remaining 11 suspects guilty of conspiracy to commit murder and murder.
– On December 2, 2022, Judge Laila Mgonya sentenced the 11 convicts to death by hanging.
The Convicts:
– Tanzanian Nationals:
9 Tanzanians were sentenced to death, including:
– Khalid Almas Mwinyi
– Rahma Almas Mwinyi
– Godfrey Salamba
– Chambie Juma Ally
– Allan Elikana Mafue
– Ismail Issah Mohamed
– Leonard Phillipo Makoi
– Ayoub Selemani Kiholi
– Abuu Omary Mkingie.
– Burundian Nationals:
2 Burundians were sentenced to death:
– Nduimana Ogiste.
– Habonimana Augustine Nyandwi.
Reactions:
– Krissie Clark, co-founder of the PAMS Foundation with Lotter, expressed relief that the trial was over but emphasized that wildlife crime devastates communities and destroys Tanzania’s natural heritage.
🌍 2. Tanzania’s Mercenary Environment: Enabling Factors.
– Regulatory Gaps:
Tanzania’s “Arms and Ammunition Act: (Chapter 223) restricts firearm possession without licenses. However, porous borders (e.g., Kenya-Tanzania) facilitate cross-border arms trafficking, as seen in the arrest of a Kenyan MP’s assassin near the border.
– Economic Drivers:
High poverty rates and unemployment create recruitment pools for mercenaries. Global precedents (e.g., Libya, Ukraine) show conflict zones attracting foreign fighters via profit incentives.
– Political and Criminal Networks:
Ivory trafficking syndicates—linked to transnational crime—likely have resources to hire assassins. Lotter’s killing occurred days after Tanzanian police seized 28 tusks tied to suspects he was investigating.
⚠️ 3. Broader Implications for Tanzania.
– Conservation Efforts:
Lotter’s death exposed risks to activists opposing wildlife crime. His intelligence-led anti-poaching model reduced elephant poaching by 50%, but his murder underscores the vulnerability of frontline defenders.
– Security Challenges:
The use of private security firms is rising globally, including in Africa (e.g., the Atlantic Council’s “Guns for Hire” podcast details mercenary normalization). In Tanzania, weak judicial follow-through on high-profile cases could embolden contract killers.
– Regional Spillover:
Cross-border criminal movement (e.g., the Kenya-Tanzania assassin capture ) indicates regional mercenary mobility, potentially facilitated by corruption or inadequate border surveillance.
💎 Conclusion.
While Tanzania’s legal framework prohibits unauthorized firearms, Lotter’s unresolved assassination—with its hallmarks of a paid hit—suggests operational “guns for hire” networks.
These are likely sustained by ivory trafficking syndicates, cross-border crime, and regulatory enforcement gaps. Strengthening judicial processes, border controls, and anti-corruption measures is critical to dismantling such networks.
Tables for Key Details:
Table 1: Key Aspects of Wayne Lotter’s Assassination.
| No. | Aspect. | Details. |
| 1.0 | Date & Location. | August 16, 2017; Dar es Salaam (airport to hotel route). |
| 2.0 | Attack Method. | Taxi ambushed, door opened, point-blank shooting; laptop stolen. |
| 3.0 | Motive Suspected. | Retaliation for anti-poaching work (PAMS Foundation); death threats received. |
| 4.0 | Trial Status (2025). | 18–22 suspects charged; proceedings delayed due to evidence compilation and DPP review. |
Table 2: Factors Enabling Mercenary Activities in Tanzania.
| No. | Factor. | Context. | Evidence from Search Results. |
| 1.0 | Firearm Regulations. | Strict licensing under *Arms and Ammunition Act*, but enforcement challenges. | (Chapter 223 provisions). |
| 2.0 | Cross-Border Crime. | Porous borders facilitate fugitive/arms movement (e.g., Kenya-Tanzania border arrests). | (MP assassination suspect). |
| 3.0 | Criminal Resources. | Ivory trade generates billions; syndicates can afford professional hitmen. | (PAMS’ impact on trafficking). |
| 4.0 | Global Mercenary Trends. | Rising use of private contractors in conflicts; documented in “Guns for Hire” podcast. | (Conflict zones). |
Lack Of Comprehensive CCTV Cameras In Dar-Es-Salaam Complicates The Investigation.
The two assassins couldn’t have masked their faces all the places they had passed donning balaclava to evade drawing attention. Therefore, the assassins must have masked their faces closer to the crime scene.
A comprehensive CCTV camera system covering most of Dar-es-Salaam could have eased the criminal investigation of unmasking their true faces before covering themselves.
The assassination of Turkish-Tanzanian businessman Alptekin Aksoy in Dar es Salaam highlights critical gaps in the city’s surveillance infrastructure, significantly impeding the investigation. Below is a detailed analysis of the key factors complicating the case:
⚖️ 1. Regulatory Void and Uncontrolled Surveillance.
– Tanzania lacks comprehensive regulations governing CCTV use in public spaces. The “Tanzania Data Protection Act of 2022” remains unenforced, leaving no legal framework for camera deployment, data storage, or access protocols. This results in:
– Patchy Coverage:
Cameras are installed haphazardly by private entities or authorities without city-wide coordination.
– Privacy vs. Security Imbalance:
While cameras proliferate, their use is often intrusive and non-transparent, eroding public trust without enhancing security efficacy.
🏙️ 2. Infrastructure Deficiencies and Urban Challenges.
– Informal Settlements:
Over 75% of Dar es Salaam’s residents live in unplanned areas like Tandale and Temeke, where infrastructure is minimal. These high-risk zones have negligible CCTV coverage, allowing criminals to move undetected.
– Rapid Urbanization:
As Africa’s “second-fastest-growing city” (projected to reach 13.4 million by 2035), surveillance systems lag behind population expansion. Flood-prone areas and congested streets further obstruct camera placement.
🔧 3. Technical and Operational Shortcomings.
– Limited Public Coverage:
Unlike global cities (e.g., London’s 65.76 cameras per 1,000 people), Dar es Salaam lacks comparable density. Most cameras are concentrated in commercial hubs, leaving peripheral areas exposed.
– Fragmented Systems:
Surveillance relies on isolated private networks (e.g., businesses using brands like Hikvision or Dahua). Footage is rarely integrated with law enforcement, delaying evidence collection.
– Ineffective Footage Use:
In Aksoy’s case, security cameras captured the attack but failed to track the assassins’ approach or escape routes due to “coverage gaps” and “masking tactics”.
🚨 4. Impact on the Aksoy Investigation.
– Critical Evidence Gaps:
The attackers, masked motorcyclists, were filmed only at the crime scene. Their journey through uncovered zones left no traceable digital footprint.
– Contextual Clues Ignored:
Aksoy was killed hours before a court victory in an inheritance dispute. Without footage of his prior movements or potential stalkers, investigators struggle to establish motives or collaborators.
– Delayed Response:
Police face challenges accessing decentralized footage, allowing perpetrators time to destroy evidence.
🌍 5. Broader Crime and Security Implications.
– Persistent Insecurity:
Dar es Salaam’s “medium safety index (36/100)” reflects risks like armed robberies and kidnappings. CCTV inefficacy exacerbates this; for example, the 2006 NBC bank heist footage led to no arrests despite clear evidence.
– Economic Costs:
Inefficient port security due to poor surveillance costs Tanzania “$15 billion annually” in trade delays, underscoring systemic vulnerabilities.
💡 Recommendations for Improvement.
– Adopt Best Practices:
Implement UK-style “Surveillance Camera Code of Practice”, emphasizing proportionality, transparency, and mandatory signage.
– Public-Private Integration:
Centralize footage via initiatives like TANESCO’s “$421 million CCTV expansion” for ports and highways, extending to urban slums.
– Leverage Technology:
Shift to “AI-powered IP cameras” with facial recognition (despite privacy concerns) to track suspects across districts.
– Community Policing:
Deploy cameras in high-crime zones (e.g., Mburahari, Kigogo) while training residents to monitor feeds, fostering collaborative security.
Table: Comparative Surveillance Levels in Global Cities.
| No. | City. | Country. | Cameras per 1,000 People. |
| 1.0 | Taiyuan | China. | 114.84. |
| 2.0 | London. | UK. | 65.76 |
| 3.0 | Hyderabad | India. | 32.40. |
| 4.0 | Dar es Salaam | Tanzania. | <5 (estimated). |
*Source: PrivacySavvy Global Surveillance Report.
Conclusion.
The Aksoy case exemplifies how Dar es Salaam’s inadequate and unregulated CCTV network cripples complex investigations. Addressing this requires “urgent regulatory enforcement”, “strategic infrastructure investment”, and “integration of emerging technologies”—balancing security needs with privacy safeguards. Without these steps, the city’s growth will continue to outpace its safety infrastructure, leaving citizens and businesses vulnerable.
Read more analysis by Rutashubanyuma Nestory
